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Abstract 
Long-run trends in Africa’s well-being are provided on the basis of a new index 
of human development, alternative to the UNDP’s HDI. A sustained improvement in 
African human development is found that falls, nonetheless, short of those 
experienced in other developing regions. Within Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen 
steadily behind the North since mid-20th century. Human development improvement is 
positively associated to being coastal and resource-rich and negatively to political-
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How has Africa performed in terms of well-being over the long-run? How has it 
behaved in comparison with other developing regions? On the basis of a new index of 
human development, constructed with an alternative approach to the United Nations 
Development Programme’s index (UNDP 2010), an attempt is made to answer these 
questions.2 The new “improved” Human Development Index (IHDI) provides 
systematically lower levels of human development, although roughly the same long-
run trends, than both the conventional, pre-2010 UNDP Index (HDI) and the new 
‘hybrid’ index (Hybrid HDI), and deepens the gap between Africa and the rest of the 
world.3 A long-run improvement in African human development is observed which 
falls, nonetheless, short of those experienced in other developing regions such us Latin 
America or South-East Asia. Human development improvement in Africa since mid-20th 
century is positively associated to being a coastal and resource rich country and 
negatively to political-economy distortions. Education has been the driving force of 
human development since 1950. Stagnating life expectancy due to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS (and the resilience of malaria) together with arrested growth, largely 
resulting from economic mismanagement, political turmoil and civil wars,  have made 
advances in human development dependent almost exclusively on education 
achievements since 1990 and help to explain Africa’s falling behind in terms of well-
being. Within Africa, the Sub-Saharan region has fallen behind the northern, Arab one, 
and a process of conditional convergence appears to have taken place over the last 
half a century. The recovery during recent years has varied widely across regions and 
countries suggesting a less optimistic prospect across the board than the one often 
expressed by international organizations and academics. 
The paper opens with a critical discussion of the conventional UNDP human 
development index and its 2010 revised version, the ‘hybrid’ HDI, and presents the 
alternative index. The sources and procedures used to construct indices for each 
                                               
2 A recent overview of human development in Africa over 1970 and 2005 is provided by Fosu and 
Mwabu (2010) on the basis of the pre-2010 UNDP index.  
3 The alternative index proposed here revises and updates the ‘improved’ index of human development 
provided in Prados de la Escosura (2010) as it incorporates the new goalposts or upper and lower 
bounds fixed and the multiplicative combination of education indicators  introduced in the UNDP 
revision of the HDI (HDR 2010) 
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dimension of human development are, then, discussed. Later, the new results for 
African human development are presented in comparative perspective, long-run 
trends across Africa’s main regions are provided, and a closer look at the determinants 
of human development at country level from 1950 onwards is taken. Some remarks 
close the paper. 
The UNDP Human Development Index: shortcomings and alternatives 
Human development was originally defined as “a process of enlarging people’s 
choices” that enables them “to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and 
to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living” (UNDP 1990: 10). 
As a synthetic measure of human development, the UNDP HDI attempts to capture a 
country’s achievements in longevity, knowledge and standard of living through various 
indicators: the relative achievement in life expectancy at birth, in education, and in “all 
dimensions of human development not reflected in a long and healthy life and in 
knowledge” for which the discounted per capita income is taken as a surrogate (UNDP, 
2001: 240).  
The way in which progress in human development is measured matters. When 
the original values of a social, non-income dimension, say, life expectancy, which have 
biological asymptotic limits, are employed identical changes in absolute terms result in 
lower increases as the starting level is higher.4 Thus, following Amartya Sen (1981), a 
linear transformation was introduced for non-income dimensions in the human 
development index (expression 1) (UNDP 1990). This linear transformation represents 
an improvement over the use of the original values since it reduces the denominator 
and widens the index range.5  
In the UNDP HDI, each dimension (I) is transformed into an index according to 
the following formula, 
I = (x - Mo) / (M - Mo),        [1] 
                                               
4 For example, 10 extra years of life expectancy represent a 33 percent increase if the initial value of life 
expectancy is 30 years, 25 percent if the starting level is 40 years … 14 percent if it is 70 years.  
5 However, as it will be shown below, it does not suffice to solve the comparability problems over time 
and space. 
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Where x is the observed value of a given dimension of welfare, and Mo and M 
represent the maximum and minimum values, or goalposts. Goalposts representing 
levels above and below those ever achieved were chosen for each indicator in order to 
facilitate comparisons over time. Each dimension ranges, thus, between 0 and 1. Then, 
the HDI was obtained, up to 2010, as the unweighted arithmetic average of the three 
dimensions’ indices. 
From 1995 to 2009 Human Development Reports kept the same goalposts. For 
life expectancy at birth the maximum and the minimum values were established at 85 
and 25 years, respectively. For education, adult literacy and gross enrolment (primary, 
secondary, and tertiary) rates, with maximum and minimum values of 100 and 0, were 
combined using two-thirds and one-third weights, respectively. In the case of per 
capita GDP, the maximum and minimum values were 40,000 and 100 dollars, 
respectively, and, in 1999, a logarithmic transformation was introduced to allow for 
the assumed diminishing returns of income in terms of human development since this 
indicator is employed as a crude proxy for those dimensions of wellbeing other than 
education and health (UNDP 1999).6  
In October 2010 the Human Development Report (UNDP 2010) introduced 
major changes in the indicators used to capture human development dimensions. 
Thus, for education the expected years of schooling for a school-age child and the 
mean years of schooling for population aged 25 and above were combined using an 
unweighted geometric average.7 In the case of income, purchasing-power-adjusted 
GDP per head was replaced by PPP-adjusted per capita Gross National Income (GNI) –
that is, GDP plus net receipts of primary income from abroad-. The inclusion of GNI per 
capita represents an improvement as it captures the income accrued to residents of a 
                                               
6 Prior to 1999 per capita income was discounted above a certain threshold -the world average income- 
with Atkinson’s formula for the utility of income. So, for example, the maximum level, $40,000 became 
just $5,448 in 1995 (UNDP 1995: 134). The logarithmic transformation implied, in turn, discounting all 
income, not just the income above a given level (UNDP 1999: 159). 
7 Mean years of schooling had been used previously in the Human Development Report 1994. The 
education attainment index was derived by weighting the mean years of schooling index by one-third 
and the adult literacy rate index by two-thirds (UNDP 1994). 
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country, not just the income produced in the country regardless the share retained at 
home.8  
The new HDI also altered its goalposts which now correspond to the maximum 
and minimum values for each dimension observed during the period 1980-2010. Upper 
and lower bounds for life expectancy have been fixed at 83.2 and 20 years, 
respectively. The expected years of schooling and the mean years of schooling were 
assigned maxima of 20.6 and 13.2 years, respectively, and minima of zero. In the case 
of per capita income, the 40,000 PPP US dollars maximum represented, at the time of 
its introduction in the early 1990s, an upper bound that no country had ever reached. 
As such an upper limit has been overcome in current price PPP dollars, it has been 
replaced by the maximum observed (108,211 PPP $ US 2008). The minimum has been 
established in 163 PPP $ US 2008. 
A major change in the new HDI results from an attempt to mitigate the 
substitutability between its different dimensions, that is, to avoid that a high 
achievement in one dimension linearly compensates for a low achievement in another, 
so the indices for each dimension are combined using a geometric, rather than an 
arithmetic, average. 
However, the new index is very data demanding, and when long-run trends are 
considered, a non negligible part of the information needed for its construction is not 
available across countries (for example, mean years of schooling or GNI). Thus, ‘old’ 
indicators (namely, literacy and school enrolment for education, and real GDP per 
head) had to be recovered in so called ‘hybrid’ human development index due to its 
wider availability over space and time. Nonetheless, the indices for each dimension 
were derived with the new goalposts and were combined with a geometric average in 
the ‘hybrid’ HDI (Gidwitz et al. 2010: 3).  
Even if the multiplicative formula of the new human development index may be 
considered a substantial improvement over the previous additive one (Desai 1991, 
                                               
8 Thus, GNI (or GNP) includes international flows such as remittances and aid, and excludes income 
generated in the country but repatriated abroad.  
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Sagar and Najam 1998)9, the linear transformation of the social, non-income 
dimensions –with asymptotic bounds- remains a serious obstacle for the comparison 
of human development levels across countries and over time. Thus, in the linear 
transformation, for a given absolute change in a social dimension, its corresponding 
increase would be larger the lower the initial level, favouring, hence, the country with 
the lower initial level of human development.10 Such a bias is only justifiable from a 
normative point of view, when the stress is place on achieving a ‘basic’ or minimum 
level of human development. Otherwise, it narrows down differences across countries 
and introducing a spurious tendency for human development levels to converge.  
An attempt to facilitate comparability of HDI levels across countries has been 
made in the Human Development Report 2010 by introducing the alternative concept 
of ‘deviation from fit’, which provides a country’s deviation from its expected 
performance, given its initial HDI (UNDP 2010: 217). Unfortunately, the ‘deviation from 
fit’ only allows precise comparisons between countries starting from the same level 
evidencing, therefore, the limitations of the new index.11  
Another option is provided by the ‘shortfall’ approach (Sen 1981: 292), which 
measures, for a given dimension, the relative fall in the distance between the country’s 
initial level and some chosen upper bound. Contrary to the linear transformation, this 
                                               
9 There are a, nonetheless, discrepancies about the choice between an arithmetic and a geometric 
average to combine the dimensions’ indices. See, for example, a harsh critique of the new index in 
Ravallion (2010). 
10 Thus, if the same absolute changes of the previous example (footnote 3) are considered with the 
linear transformation (expression 1) and the new goalposts (83.2 and 20 years, as maximum and 
minimum), 10 extra years of life expectancy would represent a 100 percent increase when the initial 
value of life expectancy is 30 years, a 50 percent increase if it is 40 years, and a 20 percent if it is 70 
years. It can be observed that the bias towards low initial levels not only remains but it is magnified by 
the linear transformation. 
11 The Human Development Report 2010 defines the ‘deviation from fit’ as “a measure of progress that 
captures changes in a country’s indicators relative to the average change for countries starting from the 
same point” (UNDP 2010: 26). 
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method tends to favour the country with the higher initial level (Gidwitz et al. 2010: 
19).12 
It appears, therefore, that a linear transformation of the original values of each 
dimension -currently used in the HDI- does not provide a solution to the comparability 
problem over space and time. Or, more precisely, in Amartya Sen’s words (1981: 292), 
“as, say, longevity becomes high, it becomes more of an achievement to raise it 
further”.13 Nanak Kakwani (1993: 312) concurs: “as the standard of living reaches 
progressively higher limits, incremental improvement should require much greater 
resources than similar incremental improvements from a lower base”.14 
Perhaps, the problem derives from the fact that ethical and measurement 
aspects of wellbeing are at odds in the human development index. As Partha Dasgupta 
(1990: 23) pointed out: 
“Equal increments are possibly of less and less ethical worth as 
life expectancy rises to 65 or 70 years and more. But we are meaning 
performance here. So it would seem that it becomes more and more 
commendable if, with increasing life expectancy, the index were to rise 
at the margin. The idea here is that it becomes more and more difficult 
to increase life expectancy as life expectancy rises.”15 
                                               
12 If the same absolute changes of the example in footnotes 3 and 8 are considered once more, 10 extra 
years of life expectancy would represent a 19 percent ‘shortfall’ reduction when the initial value of life 
expectancy is 30 years, a 23 percent ‘shortfall’ reduction if it is 40 years, and a 76 percent ‘shortfall’ 
reduction if it is 70 years. 
13 Thus, the “intrinsic” value of a single “functioning”, for example, the ability to live a healthy life, is not 
captured by its linear measure, since, as Srinivassan (1994: 240) argues, “a unit decrease in the 
deprivation in life expectancy at an initial life expectancy of, say, 40 years is not commensurate with the 
same unit decrease at 60 years”. 
14 Kakwani’s rationale can be challenged, for example, on the basis that an ‘improvement in education 
attainment may not be more difficult as the level of education becomes higher and higher’ (Tsui 1996: 
302).  
15 An example of giving priority to the ethical aspect over the measurement of wellbeing is provided by 
Noorbakhsh (1998) who modified the human development index by extending the principle of 
diminishing returns to education (but not to longevity for which the linear transformation was kept) on 
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It should be bearded in mind that in the case of, say, longevity, the longer life 
expectancy, the longer the number of years during which good health is enjoyed16. A 
similar association can be suggested between the increase in the number of years of 
schooling, or the percentage of literates among adult population, and the quality of 
the education received. 
Since social indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, or literacy have 
-in opposition to GDP per head- asymptotic limits, which reflect physical and biological 
maxima, Kakwani (1993) explored the non-linearity of the relationship between the 
value of each social indicator and its achievement. Using an axiomatic approach, 
Kakwani (1993) constructed a normalised index from an achievement function in 
which an increase in the standard of living of a country at a higher level implies a 
greater achievement than would have been the case had it occurred at a lower level17, 
f (x, Mo, M) = ((M - Mo)1- – (M – x)1-) / ((M - Mo)1-),        for 0 < <1       [2] 
= f (x, Mo, M) = (log (M - Mo) – log (M – x)) / log (M - Mo),    for  =1        [3] 
Where x is an indicator of a country’s standard of living, M and Mo are the 
maximum and minimum values, respectively, and log stands for the natural logarithm. 
The achievement function proposed by Kakwani (1993: 314) is a convex function of x, 
and it is equal to 0, if x = Mo, and equal to 1, if x = M, ranging, thus, between 0 and 1. 
                                                                                                                                         
the basis that that ‘under similar conditions the early “units” of educational attainments to a country 
should be of much higher value than the last ones’ (Noorbakhsh 1998, p. 519). 
16 The ideal measure would be health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE), that is, the average number of 
years a person can expect to live in good health. Unfortunately this measure is only available for 
developed countries since 2003. In OECD countries the proportion of years a person enjoys good health 
tends to be about 90 percent. Cf. http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/details/health/life-
expectancy.aspx#quality. A measure of health expectancy, ‘Healthy Life Years’ (HLY) has been defined as  
disability-free life expectancy and estimated for European Union countries in recent years (Cf. Jagger et 
al. 2009). It shows that, for example, in 2005, the number of Healthy Life Years (HLY) in the European 
Union (EU) reached 60.8 years for men and 62.1 years for women which represented 80.1 and 75.8 
percent of the total life expectancy at birth for men and women, respectively (EHEMU 2005). 
17 For example, in the case of longevity, “a further increase must be regarded as a greater achievement 
than an equal increase at lower levels of longevity, …the achievement must increase at a faster rate than 
the longevity” (Kakwani 1993: 313). 
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In this context, the UNDP HDI represents a particular case, for   = 0, which 
yields expression [1] for each dimension of the index.    
Following Kakwani’s proposal, the original values of the social, non-income 
dimensions of the index have been transformed using a convex achievement function 
(expression 3). 
Thus, in the alternative human development index, IHDI, as a social indicator 
reaches higher levels, its increases represent higher achievements than would have 
occurred had the same increase taken place at a lower level, while, in the UNDP ‘old’ 
and hybrid HDI, they reflect the same change regardless of its starting level.18 The new 
“improved” human development index [IHDI] was derived, then, as a multiplicative 
combination of the transformed values of each dimension. 
If we denote, as L and E, the non-linearly transformed values of life expectancy 
and education, and as UNY the adjusted per capita income, the “improved” human 
development index can be expressed as, 
IHDI = L1/3 E1/3 UNY1/3                                       [4] 
Human development dimensions: sources and procedures 
A brief presentation of the sources and procedures used to construct indices 
for each dimension of human development is provided in this section. A more detailed 
explanation is offered in the Appendix A. Data availability precludes presenting 
estimates by country before 1950, but population-weighted averages for five regions: 
North, Central, East, West, and Southern, as well as for Sub-Saharan Africa (which 
includes the last four regions) and Africa as a whole, are provided at benchmark years 
back to 1870.19  
Although the new goalposts have been accepted, due to the use of a convex 
achievement function, some minor modifications were introduced to improve the 
                                               
18 If the same absolute changes of the example in footnote 3 are considered with the convex 
transformation (expression 3) and the new goalposts once again, 10 extra years of life expectancy would 
represent a 121 percent increase when the initial value of life expectancy is 30 years, a 69 percent 
increase if it is 40 years, and a 90 percent increase if it is 70 years. 
19 These five regions are defined according the African Development Bank (See Appendix A).  
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presentation of the results. Thus, for life expectancy at birth, although UNDP (2010) 
maximum and minimum levels of 83.2 and 20 years have been adopted, the lowest 
historical level has been set at 25 years.20  
Life expectancy data for most countries during the period 1980-2007 comes 
from the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP 2010) while the United Nations’ 
Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement (United Nations 2000) provides the rest 
of the data from 1950 onwards. Pre-1950 estimates come mostly from James Riley 
(2005b). Dearth of data forced me to make some strong assumptions. Thus, lower 
bound estimates for the 1940s (and even occasionally 1950) were accepted for 1938. 
Furthermore, prior to 1929, life expectancy at birth was assumed to be 25 years (the 
assumed minimum historical value) for most Sub-Saharan African countries (See 
Appendix A). The reader may wonder to what extent the results are conditioned by 
these assumptions. The fact that the demographic transition was comparatively 
delayed in Africa, usually not until the 1920s, when life expectancy at birth had mean 
and median values of 26.4 and 25.4 years, respectively (Riley 2005b), suggests that the 
bias introduced by these assumptions is not significant.  
In the case of education indicators (literacy and enrolment rates), UNDP values 
of M=100 and Mo=0 have been kept, but the highest and lowest historical values were 
set at 99 and 1 percent, respectively.21 
Empirically, adult literacy is a far from uniform concept. Reading and writing do 
not necessarily go together in developing countries (Markussen 1990, Nilsson 1999) 
                                               
20 Truncating the lower part of the distribution by assuming a life expectancy ‘floor’ of 25 years -which is 
not far from the actual value in the poorest developing countries, both in the present and in the past- 
has the advantage of allowing the inclusion of countries for which no data are available. Moreover, 
given a minimum, Mo, of 20 years, the 25 years ‘floor’ of precludes a zero value for the transformed life 
expectancy and, consequently, for the IHDI. 
21 The assumption of 1 percent as the lowest historical value for literacy and enrolment seems 
historically more reasonable than accepting zero, as do the ‘old’ and hybrid HDI, while a historical 
maximum of 99 percent is also accepted for adult literacy in the HDI, but not in the hybrid HDI, in which 
the maximum observed level for the gross enrolment rate is 115.8 percent (Gidwitz et al. 2010). A 
consequence of assuming a historical lower bound of 1 percent is preventing zero values for the 
transformed variables.  
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and, thus, the estimated literacy rate varies depending on whether a wide (reading 
ability only) or a narrow (reading and writing skills) definition of literacy is used. The 
uncertainty about literacy rates even in recent times is evidenced by the wide 
discrepancies between the UNESCO and UNDP figures over the years 1980-95 and, 
thus, in order to keep consistency with those from the Human Development Reports, I 
have chosen the UNDP figures with a few exceptions.22 
The 2009 Human Development Report (UNDP 2009) provides most of the data 
on literacy for 1980-2007. Most data from 1950 onwards come from UNESCO (1970, 
2002) and the World Bank (2010), completed with data from Banks (2010), Hayami and 
Ruttan (1985), and Easterly (1999). UNESCO (1953, 1957) and Flora (1973) provide 
data for the pre-1950 era. 
Enrolment rates basically capture the expansion of formal education and do not 
inform about the length of the academic year, the quality of education, or student 
completion (Benavot and Riddle 1988). Historical evidence only allows one to estimate 
the unadjusted rate of total enrolment, that is to say, the percentage of population 
aged 5-24 enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Only for the recent 
past, international organisations (UNESCO, OECD, World Bank) provided gross 
enrolment rates, in which the denominator is adjusted to the age bracket for each type 
of schooling (primary, secondary, etc.). Thus, unadjusted rates will usually under-
estimate gross enrolment rates, as, in the past, hardly any country’s education 
extended to those aged 24 years. For the historical (pre-1980) estimates this 
downward bias has been corrected with the ratio between the gross and unadjusted 
enrolment rates in 1980. 
The 2009 Human Development Report (UNDP 2009) provides most of the data 
enrolment for 1980-2007, completed with UNESCO (2010). For the pre-1970 period, 
enrolment figures come mostly from UNESCO (2010), Banks (2010) and Mitchell 
(2003a, 2003b, 2003c).23 With regard to the relevant population, see the Appendix A.  
                                               
22 The exceptions are Algeria (1990-1995) and Botswana (1980-85). See the Appendix A. 
23 Data for Algeria and Tunisia come from Fargues (1986). 
 13
The UNHDI assumption that the marginal utility of per capita income declines 
as it reaches higher levels has been accepted. Were such an assumption relaxed, the 
range within which human development levels vary would increase substantially. The 
fact that this transformed measure was chosen by the UNDP to proxy any dimension of 
well-being (excluding health and education) explains why such an astringent 
assumption has been kept. Thus, the log of GDP per head is employed in expression 
[1].  
In historical terms, there is practically no discrepancy in the available per capita 
GDP figures (expressed in Geary-Khamis [G-K] 1990 $) between the old UNDP ‘cap’ (G-
K 1990 $ 40,000) and the new ‘observed maximum’ (G-K 1990 $ 42,916 for Qatar in 
1973), although a significant difference appears between the previous lower bound of 
$100 and the observed minimum of $ 206 (D.R. Congo in 2001) (Maddison 2010).24 
Similarly to the cases of social indicators, I have assumed a lower bound for per capita 
GDP that has been set at G-K 1990 $ 300, which represents a basic level of 
physiological subsistence (Sagar and Najam 1998: 254, Milanovic et al. 2011), below 
the World Bank’s extreme poverty threshold of G-K 1990 $ 1 a day per person and 
Maddison’s (2006) G-K 1990 $ 400 per head.25 
Post-1950 GDP per head (G-K 1990 $) data come from Maddison (2006, 2010) 
unless stated in the Appendix A. Pre-1950 era estimates are scant.26 As Gareth Austin 
(2008a: 1011) put it, “there are no very serious estimates of aggregate output, because 
we do not know the size of domestic marketed activity, nor of non-marketed output”.  
                                               
24 In the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP 2010), expressed in 2008 international dollars, the 
lowest level observed since 1980 has been established in $163, which is equivalent to $108 in 1990 
Geary-Khamis dollars. The highest per capita income level reached over the same time span, $ 108,211 
international dollars of 2008, corresponds to $ 72,020 Geary-Khamis dollars of 1990. Such a figure has 
never been achieved in Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars (Maddison 2010) estimates, so I have chosen the 
observed maximum and minimum values over 1870-2007 in Maddison (2010) estimates.  
25 This lower bound for per capita income which, no doubt, truncates the data set at the bottom, allows 
me to consider countries in earlier periods for which no data exist and that, otherwise, would reduce 
the country sample considered here. 
26 Ghana, along South Africa, is the only Sub-Saharan African country for which crude estimates exist 
(Maddison 2006). Maddison (2006, 2010) also provides estimates and conjectures for North Africa.  
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Austin suggests using the much better information on the income terms of 
trade although -he warns us- probably overestimate per capita income growth. In fact, 
attempts have been made at approximating GDP per head with the purchasing power 
of exports or income terms of trade (that is, the value of exports per head deflated by 
the price of imports) (Manning 1982). As “specialization for export production is at the 
heart of Africa’s growth episodes” (Jerven 2010: 130), Szereszewski (1965) drew trends 
in output per head for late 19th-early 20th century Ghana by assuming that traditional 
consumption per head was stagnant and all the increase in output per head resulted 
from the modern sector of the economy linked to the international economy.  
Thus, one possibility is to derive per capita GDP by assuming that no increase in 
output per head took place outside the part of the economy associated to 
international trade which would grow, in turn, as the purchasing power of per capita 
exports. In such a restrictive assumption an additional problem is setting the relative 
size, in terms of GDP of the traditional, non-tradable, and the modern, tradable, 
sectors, as well as the trade spillovers.  
Since this is a too astringent and rather arbitrary procedure, I chose an 
alternative econometric approach to establish an association between per capita GDP 
and the income terms of trade per head (that is, the value of current exports deflated 
by the price of imports and, then, divided by each country’s population) on the basis of 
the available evidence for the post-1950 period.27 Using a panel data approach with 
nine benchmarks (for years ended in 0 and 5), the log of GDP per head (Maddison 
2010) was regressed on the log of per capita income terms of trade -computed by 
deflating African countries’ nominal export values with the industrial countries’ export 
unit values (taken from IMF 2003) and, then, divided by the countries’ population 
(from Maddison 2010)-, its quadratic term –in order to allow for non-linearities-, a 
time trend interacting with the log of income terms of trade –which would capture 
whether the association between  per capita income and  the income terms of trade 
changes over time, and dummy variables to capture whether a country was coastal 
(value 1) or landlocked (value 0), resource rich (1) or poor (0) (from Collier and 
                                               
27 Actually, only data for the period 1950-1990 was used since the impact of civil wars and, particularly, 
HIV-AIDS probably may have represented a major regime change. 
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O’Connell 2008), had a colonial background (1, if former French colony; 2, if former 
British colony; 0 otherwise) (Bertocchi and Canova 2002), and to which of the five 
regions distinguished by the African Development Bank (north, central, east, west, and 
southern) it belonged. The econometric results, provided in the Appendix B, Tables B1-
B4, show a god fit that explains almost three-fourths of the variance. Using the 
parameters from the equation and the values of each independent variable, GDP per 
head levels were obtained for African countries over the period 1870-1938, under the 
arbitrary assumption that the econometric relationship derived for the period 1950-
1990 is stable over time. Although this represents a ‘heroic’ assumption, it seems to be 
the best alternative given the lack of data on Africa’s GDP, limited to Maddison’s 
(2010) conjectures for the continent as a whole at 1870, 1900, 1913, and 1940 
benchmarks.28  
For those few countries for which GDP estimates were available, these were 
accepted and used together with those indirectly estimated. See Appendix A. 
Later, per capita income levels were transformed into indices, using logs, with 
expression [1] and, then, combined with education and life expectancy indices in order 
to obtain human development indices for each country. Then, as pre-1950 individual 
country values would be highly conjectural, population-weighted aggregates were 
computed for the five regions, North, Central, West, East, and Southern, defined by 
the African Development Bank (See Appendix D for the original values of life 
expectancy, education, and GDP per head for Africa and its main regions).29  
Trends in Human Development 
A long-run improving trend in human development for Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa is offered by both the hybrid and the new indices in which three differentiated 
phases can be distinguished, in which between two periods of slow growth, 1870-1913 
and 1980-2007, a sustained improvement took place (Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1). 
Some major discrepancies exist, nonetheless, between the UNDP indices, both the 
‘old’ and new ‘hybrid’ HDI, on the one hand, and the ‘improved”’ one (IHDI), on the 
                                               
28 There are unpublished estimates for Sub-Saharan African GDP, 1910-1950, by Smits (2006). 
29 As Jerven put it (2009: 77), “with the exception of some resource-rich enclaves, a few island states, 
and South Africa, the income of one African economy is not meaningfully different from another”.  
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other: a significant difference in their initial levels -much lower in the case of the IHDI-, 
a widening gap in absolute (but not in relative) terms between them, with the IHDI 
lagging behind, and a faster growth for the IHDI. Another important discrepancy is 
that, in the IHDI, differences across countries deepen, and the gap between Africa and 
the rest of the world widens. Thus, although relative to the world as a whole, Africa 
(and Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA]) follow the same trends: falling behind until 1913; 
catching up until 1980; and, thereafter, stagnating (Africa) and falling behind (SSA) –at 
least, until 2000- their comparative levels are significantly lower in the IHDI (Figures 3 
and 4). Thus, according to the hybrid HDI, Africa and SSA represented 70 and 64 
percent of the world average by 2007, while they only reached 55 and 48 percent, 
respectively, with the IHDI. 
A better perception of Africa’s human development performance is obtained by 
comparison with that of other developing regions (Table 2 and Figure 5). Africa and 
Asia (excluding Japan) started from similar levels, with Africa’s (and Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s) IHDI representing about four-fifths (and three-fourths) of Asia’s. Progress in 
Asia during the early twentieth century increased the differential, but Africa managed 
to reduce it during the 1930s and 1940s, and, again, in the 1970s, but fell behind since 
1980. The comparison to the developed world (OECD countries) indicates that, while 
Asia and Latin America have been catching up since the early twentieth century - with 
Asia reducing its differential with Latin America - Africa and, in particular, Sub-Saharan 
Africa ceased to catch up from 1980 onwards, when their level of human development 
was less than one-third of OECD’s (Figure 6).30 
Gains in the IHDI are driven by the progress of its social dimensions. Life 
expectancy is the main contributor to improving long-run human development in the 
world, particularly between 1880 and 1990 (Prados de la Escosura 2010). This fact is 
associated with the diffusion of preventive methods of disease transmission -including 
low cost improvements in health and knowledge-dissemination through schooling 
                                               
30 OECD here refers to its pre-1995 members: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland – only since 1990-, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. No estimates have been obtained for 
Luxemburg. Turkey, although an OECD member, has been included in Asia in order to make the group 
more homogeneous in terms of development.  
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(Riley 2005a)-, with the introduction of new vaccines (since the 1890s) and drugs to 
cure infectious diseases (sulfa drugs since the late 1930s and antibiotics since the 
1950s) (Easterlin 1999, Jayachandran et al. 2010), and with the public provision of 
health (McKeown et al., 1975, McKinley and McKinley 1977, Loudon 2000, Cutler and 
Miller 2005). 
In Africa (and Sub-Saharan Africa), however, life expectancy was the main 
contributor to the improvement of human development only during the 1930s and 
1940s and, then, education took the lead (Tables 3-4 and Figure 7). The collapse of life 
expectancy -largely as a result of HIV-AIDS-, together with the contraction in per capita 
income and the deceleration in the education expansion -associated to ethnic conflicts 
and unsound economic policies (Collier 2000)-, explain the weak advance in human 
development during the last two decades of the twentieth century. The reversal of this 
trend in the 2000s has been helped by the recovery in economic activity and, to less 
extent, in life expectancy, although education remains the main force behind the 
advance in African human development. This picture is stressed when the focus shifts 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, where life expectancy made a negative contribution during the 
1990s (Figure 8). The comparison with other developing regions stresses the sluggish 
improvement of life expectancy in Africa and helps to explain the continent’s widening 
lag in human development. Catching up with OECD countries slowed down in the 
developing regions from the 1970s onwards and came to a halt from 1990 onwards, 
when Africa fell behind (Figures 9-10). A mild catching up in education did not suffice 
to offset the life expectancy backlash (Figures 11-12) 
Within Africa, a growing divergence between North and Sub-Saharan Africa 
emerged since mid-twentieth century and deepened from 1980 onwards (Figure 13). A 
closer look at Sub-Saharan Africa regions reveals persistent differences in levels of 
human development between Southern Africa and the rest, and highlights the change 
in the regional balance from 1990 with Central Africa falling behind and Southern 
Africa stagnating and being caught up by the western and eastern regions in the 2000s 
(Table 5 and Figure 14). 
When the IHDI is decomposed into its dimensions, it emerges that life 
expectancy was a major force in North Africa between 1938 and 1950 and still a 
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substantial one during the 1950s. South of the Sahara its role, however, was less 
significant, dominating only in the 1930s (West Africa) and in the 1940s (Southern 
Africa), with the exception of the East in which longevity constituted the almost 
exclusive source of human development progress between 1929 and 1950 (Figures 15-
19). The collapse of per capita income growth in Sub-Saharan regions since the mid-
1970s -especially dramatic in Central Africa and to a lesser extent in Southern Africa- 
together with longevity’s poor performance -which declined in the Central and 
Southern regions at the turn of the century-, meant that during the second half of the 
twentieth century most of the gains in human development came from education in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Data availability allows us to decompose regional behaviour at country level 
only from 1950 onwards (Tables 6-7). Following Paul Collier and Stephen O’Connell 
(2008), a typology of success in raising human development in Africa can be 
established as the interaction of opportunities (location and endowments) and 
choices. In such an interaction, these authors emphasise the negative role played by 
‘dysfunctional political-economy configurations’ or ‘syndromes’, that is, “salient 
episodes of purposive failure attributable to human agency within the society” (Collier 
and O’Connell 2008: 89). Syndromes are defined by the choices made and may be 
classified into four categories: regulatory31, distributive32, inter-temporal33, and state 
breakdown34. 
                                               
31 This implies regulation of economic activity, the ownership of productive enterprises by the state, and 
state-led industrialization behind high trade barriers and financed through the taxation of exports 
(Collier and O’Connell 2008: 90). These authors all distinguish between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ regulatory 
controls. 
32 This syndrome concerns “redistribution of income between ethno-regional groups” (Collier and 
O’Connell 2008: 89, 91-2). An extreme form is looting by which is meant “a situation in which assets, 
whether private or public, are stripped outside the context of the rule of law and due process”. 
33 Two main ones are described: anticipated redistribution –which occurs when an elite group 
anticipates a loss of power-, and unsustainable spending –which syndrome occurs when a country fails 
to transform temporary income into permanent income (Collier and O’Connell 2008: 94-95). 
34 In which the state is unable to maintain internal security (Collier and O’Connell 2008: 96). 
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 In North Africa, coastal, resource-rich countries appear at the top. Libya 
exhibits the highest level of human development followed by Tunisia and Algeria, with 
the former catching up to Libya from 2000 onwards. Mauritania, coastal, resource-rich, 
and largely a syndrome-free country remained, though, at the bottom even though she 
experienced an intense improvement over 1950-70. 
If we take a closer look at Sub-Saharan regions we find that, in Central Africa, a 
clear divide appears to exist between coastal, resource-rich countries (Gabon, Congo -
until the mid 1980s-, and Equatorial Guinea -since the mid-1990s) and landlocked, 
resource-poor countries (CAR, Chad, and Democratic Republic of Congo). State 
breakdown, including civil conflict, and looting, are features of these three countries, 
and especially dramatic in D.R. Congo. The overall negative human development 
performance of the region during the 1990s, largely associated with the decline in life 
expectancy as a result of HIV/AIDS, is attributable to the behaviour of the two Congo 
states.  
In West Africa, coastal and increasingly syndrome-free countries: Cape Verde, 
especially, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire –until 1990-, with Benin and Nigeria joining them in 
the early 21st century, are above the regional average, while landlocked, and resource-
poor countries and syndrome victims (Burkina Faso, Mali –which suffered from looting 
between the late 1960s and the early 1990s-, and Niger –a failed state during the 
1990s) are way below the average level. An exceptional addition is Sierra Leone, a 
coastal resource-rich country, but a breakdown state in the 1990s. 
 In East Africa, landlocked, resource-poor countries: Ethiopia –suffering hard 
regulatory controls-, Burundi –a breakdown state in the 1960s and from the late 1980s 
onwards, and under regulatory and redistributive syndromes-, and, to less extent, 
Rwanda -which experienced a redistributive syndrome between the early 1970s and 
1990s- are at the bottom of human development. Seychelles, in particular, and Kenya - 
until 2000- are way ahead the rest. Interestingly, Uganda and Sudan-landlocked, 
resource-poor nations, suffering looting and state failure during different periods-, and 
Tanzania -coastal but poorly endowed-, have been catching up to Kenya since the late 
1990s.  
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In Southern Africa, Angola and Mozambique, coastal countries severely hit by 
civil war, state failure, and regulatory and redistributive syndromes, and to a lesser 
extent, Malawi, a landlocked but syndrome-free country, have been at the bottom, 
with the post-1990 addition of Zimbabwe and Zambia. The latter’s misfortunes can 
hardly be attributed to being landlocked, but to their economic and political 
mismanagement (Mwanawina and Mulungushi 2008). Zambia, a resource rich country, 
experienced ‘unsustainable spending’ from the early 1970s to the late 1980s (Jerven 
2010b). In Zimbabwe, hard regulatory controls (including state ownership of 
enterprises and protectionism) since 1980 have gone hand-in-hand with looting at the 
turn of the 21st century.  Meanwhile, at the top, we find coastal and largely syndrome-
free countries: Mauritius, clearly ahead of the rest, Namibia, and, despite having been 
hit by HIV/AIDS since 1990, South Africa and Botswana (Maitpose and Matsheka 2010; 
Jerven 2010b).  
If we look, now, at the country ranking, we find that northern and southern 
countries compose the first quartile throughout the six decades considered. Resource-
rich countries and small islands have gradually gained weight over time and, since 
2000, comprised the top decile. North African countries have improved their relative 
position, and, by 2007, all, but Mauritania, were in the first quartile (and three in the 
top decile), while, in 1950, only three of them (Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia) belonged 
there (Table 8). As regards Sub-Saharan countries, only Mauritius, Namibia, and South 
Africa, from the southern region, have been part of the first quartile over the entire 
period 1950-2007. Other countries in the southern region belonged temporarily to the 
first quartile –Madagascar, until 1960; Lesotho, up to 1965; Zambia, until 1970; and 
Zimbabwe, up to 1990-. In addition, Swaziland and Botswana joined it in 1965 and 
1975, and remained there until 1995 and 2000, respectively. Remarkable are the cases 
of Zimbabwe, which moved from the first to the third quartile between 1990 and 2007, 
and Zambia, which fell steadily from the top quartile in 1970 to the fourth quartile in 
2007. In other regions south of the Sahara only few countries were temporarily part of 
the first quartile.35 
                                               
35 That is, Congo (1975-1990), Equatorial Guinea (2000-2007), and Gabon (1965-2007) in Central Africa; 
Ghana (1950-1965), and Cape Verde (1995-2007) in West Africa; and Uganda (1950), Kenya (1975-1980) 
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The lowest quartile has had a very stable composition: most countries at the 
bottom have remained there throughout the nearly sixty years considered. These 
include landlocked and resource-poor countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, in West 
Africa; Burundi, in East Africa; and Chad, in Central Africa) and coastal countries, both 
resource-rich (Guinea, and Sierra Leone) and resource-poor (Guinea-Bissau, and 
Ethiopia, until 1993), all of them having gone through episodes of severe economic 
regulation and redistribution, including looting, and/or state breakdown. These 
bottom countries were joined at the turn of the twentieth century by landlocked and 
resource poor countries -CAR (1980-2007), Rwanda (1990-1995), and D.R. Congo 
(1995-2007)-, which had in common failed states and civil conflict, plus Zambia (2000-
2007) -a resource-rich one which suffered the unsustainable spending syndrome 
associated to  the depletion of its copper deposits-, and Mozambique (1985-1995) and 
Angola (at the bottom over 1950-1975, and, again, 1990-2000), which experienced 
regulatory syndrome, including looting, and state breakdown, associated to civil war. 
A glance at the country ranking in terms of human development progress is also 
illuminating (Table 9). Fast improving countries exhibit a negative correlation with their 
initial levels over 1950-2007 (-0.65) (Table 8). This suggests a mild tendency to 
convergence. In fact, nine of the twelve countries in the upper quartile, in terms of 
human development gains over 1950-2007, belonged to the lower quartile of the level 
of human development in 1950. The opposite is found for the slowest improving 
countries, with seven out of twelve countries belonging to the upper quartile in 1950. 
When a shorter time-span is considered, 1950-1980, the negative correlation is slightly 
weaker (-0.6), and this translates in that only five out of twelve countries in the top 
quartile of growth belong to the lowest quartile in terms of levels in 1950, and seven of 
the twelve slowest improvers pertain to the top quartile in terms of levels in 1950. The 
correlation weakens further over 1980-2007 (-0.4) and only four out of twelve of the 
top performers in terms of human development improvement were at the bottom of 
1980 levels, while six of the twelve slowest improvers pertain to the top quartile in 
terms of levels in 1980. 
                                                                                                                                         
and Seychelles (1990-2007) in East Africa. Since no human development estimates are available for 
Seychelles before 1990 there is possibility that it already belonged to the first quartile.  
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Which dimensions of human development determine the improvement in the 
IHDI across African countries? Education emerges as the main force throughout the 
last six decades (about two thirds of it in Sub-Saharan Africa and 60 percent in Africa), 
with its contribution enhanced during the last three decades due to the slowing down 
in longevity gains (up to three-fourths and two-thirds in SSA and Africa, respectively) 
(Figures 20-22). In fact, a significant distinction can be made between the pre- and 
post-1980 periods. Over the period 1950-1980, life expectancy was the second main 
contributor to human development progress, with a stable share of around one-third. 
However, since 1980, the share of life expectancy has fallen to about 20 percent in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (although increased in North Africa) and, more importantly, its 
variance increased across countries, with a negative contribution, on average, in 
Southern Africa (-10 percent) and a very low contribution in Central Africa (15 percent, 
on average). Meanwhile, the always residual contribution of income, below 10 percent 
over 1950-1980, collapsed into insignificance during the period 1980-2007. It is worth 
noting that regions whose life expectancy was higher in 1980 were those more heavily 
hit by HIV/AIDS, so the mild convergence observed is, to a large extent, its result. 
So far, a descriptive typology of African countries through out the post-1950 
era has been carried out from which it can be suggested that being a coastal and  a 
resource rich country appears to be correlated with a higher level of human 
development. Moreover, free-syndromes countries behave, on average, better in 
terms of human development than more regulated societies, particularly, those 
suffering severe syndromes of regulation and redistribution, looting, especially.  
Furthermore, low human development and civil and conflict seem to be correlated, as 
suggested by the experiences of war-torn countries.36 A more precise association can 
be derived, however, through a pool regression on the basis of  six periods (1950-60, 
1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000, 2000-2007) are offered. Thus, the log growth 
rate of human development over each decade has been regressed on the (log of the) 
level of human development at the initial year, and a set of dummies capturing 
whether, at the initial year of each decade, countries suffered from syndromes, were 
                                               
36 Angola and Mozambique (1970s-1990s), Burundi (1990s), Chad (1970s), D.R. Congo (since the 1970s 
and, especially, in the 1990s), and CAR (1970s and 1980s) 
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coastal, resource rich,located in the north of Africa, and with a colonial past (had the 
country been a British colony, value 2; French colony, value 1; 0, otherwise)..37 The 
econometric results –derived with fixed period effects- confirm some of the 
descriptive results presented in a less systematic way above (Table 10). There is 
convergence, which increases when it is conditioned. That is, a negative and 
statistically significant association is observed between the rate of variation of human 
development and its initial level. The colonial legacy had a negative, but not 
statistically significant, impact on the growth rate. Countries suffering from syndromes 
achieve a lower improvement of its human development for identical initial levels of 
human development.  Moreover, being a coastal, rather than landlocked country, and 
to a lesser extent, resource-rich, brings with it, other things being equal, higher gains in 
human development. Furthermore, being part of the northern region goes together 
with higher growth in human development for any given initial level.  
After looking at beta-convergence, it is worth considering how the inter-
country dispersion (sigma-convergence) of human development evolved in post-1950 
Africa. Three differentiated phases can be established, one of declining inequality up 
to 1980, though more intense until 1970, that appears deeper in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in the continent as a whole (Figure 23). Moreover, when population-weighted, 
the decline in dispersion is less intense. Then, the dispersion increased between 1980 
and 1995, especially for Sub-Saharan Africa (population-weighted measure). Lastly, a 
sustained reduction in inequality, stronger in Sub-Saharan Africa, is observed since 
1995. If, in turn, the dispersion of each of the human development dimensions is 
considered, it becomes clear that the main force behind the inter-country inequality 
decline in human is education, which exhibits a steady fall since 1950, but for the years 
1980-1995 (Figure 25). Inter-national inequality in life expectancy follows the three 
phases previously described for human development in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 24); but when Africa as a whole is considered, inequality increases steadily 
between 1980 and 2005, highlighting the growing divergence between the north and 
the south of the Sahara. Income’s dispersion, in turn, goes up in both Africa and Sub-
                                               
37 I have extended the coverage of the syndrome dummy to 1950 and to North Africa following Collier 
and O’Connell (2008) criteria. 
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Saharan Africa between 1980 and 2005 to reverse the inter-country inequality 
contraction of the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 26). 
Concluding Remarks 
Africa’s human development in the long-run and from a comparative 
perspective has been the focus of this paper. New historical indices of human 
development, built in an attempt to mitigate the shortcomings of the UNDP index, are 
presented. The new IHDI provides systematically lower levels but faster improvement 
of African human development, and, at the same time, widens the absolute gap 
between Africa and the developed countries. 
A long-run improvement in human development is observed for Africa that, 
nonetheless, falls short of the achievements in Asia or Latin America. Compared to the 
developed world, Africa stopped catching up in 1980 to fall behind. Within Africa, a 
growing divergence between North and Sub-Saharan Africa emerged from the mid-
twentieth century and has deepened since 1980.  
Life expectancy has been the main contributor to human development 
improvement in the world. In Africa, however, life expectancy was only leading its 
advance during the 1930s and 1940s and education became the driving force since 
mid-twentieth century. In fact, stagnation of life expectancy and arrested growth 
explain Africa’s comparative decline in human development despite the advance in 
education during the late twentieth century. 
Location and resource endowment, as well as former colonial status, influence 
the level of human development and condition its rate of growth. However, a major 
and negative influence derives from the political-economic distortions or syndromes 
that have afflicted the continent, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, since 
independence. 
A reversal in the longevity decline, as a result of the fight against HIV/AIDS, and, 
especially, an improvement in economic activity, have contributed to a mild recovery 
of human development in the 2000s, in which education continues to play the main 
role. The large variance in countries’ behaviour suggests being cautious about the 
extent this improvement will provide the foundations for a change in trend which 
would allow Africa and, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa, to catching up with the West.
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Table 1 Human Development in Africa, 1870-2007: IHDI and Hybrid HDI  
 
Panel A Levels    
 Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
 IHDI Hybrid HDI IHDI Hybrid HDI 
1870 0.028 0.070 0.025 0.062 
1880 0.029 0.074 0.027 0.066 
1890 0.032 0.080 0.029 0.071 
1900 0.034 0.085 0.031 0.076 
1913 0.038 0.095 0.034 0.085 
1929 0.051 0.129 0.047 0.118 
1938 0.064 0.160 0.060 0.149 
1950 0.087 0.210 0.081 0.196 
1960 0.117 0.272 0.108 0.254 
1970 0.148 0.333 0.139 0.314 
1980 0.185 0.399 0.173 0.376 
1990 0.206 0.425 0.185 0.391 
2000 0.225 0.446 0.194 0.403 
2007 0.252 0.490 0.220 0.449 
Panel B Average Growth Rates (%)   
 Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
 IHDI Hybrid HDI IHDI Hybrid HDI 
1870-1880 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 
1880-1890 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
1890-1900 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 
1900-1913 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 
1913-1929 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 
1929-1938 2.5 2.4 2.8 2.6 
1938-1950 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 
1950-1960 3.0 2.6 2.9 2.6 
1960-1970 2.3 2.0 2.5 2.1 
1970-1980 2.3 1.8 2.2 1.8 
1980-1990 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.4 
1990-2000 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.3 
2000-2007 1.6 1.3 1.8 1.5 
     
1870-1913 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
1913-1980 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.2 
1980-2007 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.7 
     
1913-1950 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.2 
1950-1980 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 
     
1950-2007 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.5 
     
1870-2007 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 
 
Sources: See the text. 
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Table 2 Human Development [IHDI] across World Developing Regions 1870-2007 
 
Panel A Levels    
 Latin America Asia (excluding Japan) Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
1870 0.055 0.032 0.028 0.025 
1880 0.060 0.033 0.029 0.027 
1890 0.072 0.039 0.032 0.029 
1900 0.084 0.039 0.034 0.031 
1913 0.107 0.044 0.038 0.034 
1929 0.138 0.067 0.051 0.047 
1938 0.157 0.083 0.064 0.060 
1950 0.215 0.107 0.087 0.081 
1960 0.263 0.161 0.117 0.108 
1970 0.313 0.209 0.148 0.139 
1980 0.374 0.241 0.185 0.173 
1990 0.403 0.289 0.206 0.185 
2000 0.481 0.354 0.225 0.194 
2007 0.520 0.406 0.252 0.220 
     
Panel B Average Growth Rates (%)   
 Latin America Asia (excluding Japan) Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 
1870-1880 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.7 
1880-1890 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 
1890-1900 1.5 0.0 0.8 0.8 
1900-1913 1.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 
1913-1929 1.6 2.7 1.9 1.9 
1929-1938 1.5 2.4 2.5 2.8 
1938-1950 2.6 2.1 2.5 2.5 
1950-1960 2.0 4.1 3.0 2.9 
1960-1970 1.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 
1970-1980 1.8 1.4 2.3 2.2 
1980-1990 0.7 1.8 1.1 0.7 
1990-2000 1.8 2.0 0.9 0.5 
2000-2007 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.8 
     
1870-1913 1.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
1913-1980 1.9 2.6 2.4 2.4 
1980-2007 1.2 1.9 1.1 0.9 
     
1913-1950 1.9 2.4 2.2 2.3 
1950-1980 1.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 
     
1950-2007 1.5 2.3 1.9 1.8 
     
1870-2007 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6 
 
Sources: Table 1 and Prados de la Escosura (2011). 
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Table 3 Human Development and Its Dimensions: Africa, 1870-2007 
 
Panel A     
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
1870 0.028 0.021 0.007 0.153 
1880 0.029 0.022 0.007 0.155 
1890 0.032 0.022 0.009 0.162 
1900 0.034 0.024 0.010 0.169 
1913 0.038 0.026 0.011 0.190 
1929 0.051 0.033 0.019 0.207 
1938 0.064 0.049 0.024 0.224 
1950 0.087 0.082 0.032 0.247 
1960 0.117 0.110 0.052 0.278 
1970 0.148 0.134 0.076 0.317 
1980 0.185 0.161 0.118 0.335 
1990 0.206 0.187 0.145 0.321 
2000 0.225 0.197 0.182 0.317 
2007 0.252 0.212 0.213 0.355 
     
Panel B Annual IHDI Growth and its Decomposition  
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
1870-1880 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 
1880-1890 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.1 
1890-1900 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.2 
1900-1913 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.3 
1913-1929 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.2 
1929-1938 2.5 1.4 0.8 0.3 
1938-1950 2.5 1.4 0.8 0.3 
1950-1960 3.0 1.0 1.6 0.4 
1960-1970 2.3 0.6 1.2 0.4 
1970-1980 2.3 0.6 1.5 0.2 
1980-1990 1.1 0.5 0.7 -0.1 
1990-2000 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.0 
2000-2007 1.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 
     
1870-1913 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.2 
1913-1980 2.4 0.9 1.2 0.3 
1980-2007 1.1 0.3 0.7 0.1 
     
1913-1950 2.2 1.1 1.0 0.2 
1950-1980 2.5 0.7 1.4 0.3 
     
1950-2007 1.9 0.6 1.1 0.2 
     
1870-2007 1.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 
 
Sources: See the text. 
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Table 4 Human Development and Its Dimensions: Sub-Saharan Africa, 1870-2007 
 
Panel A     
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
1870 0.025 0.021 0.005 0.131 
1880 0.027 0.022 0.006 0.131 
1890 0.029 0.023 0.007 0.136 
1900 0.031 0.024 0.008 0.145 
1913 0.034 0.025 0.010 0.164 
1929 0.047 0.032 0.017 0.186 
1938 0.060 0.049 0.022 0.204 
1950 0.081 0.076 0.030 0.231 
1960 0.108 0.098 0.049 0.263 
1970 0.139 0.123 0.072 0.301 
1980 0.173 0.146 0.117 0.304 
1990 0.185 0.161 0.139 0.283 
2000 0.194 0.159 0.165 0.276 
2007 0.220 0.171 0.198 0.315 
     
Panel B Annual IHDI Growth and its Decomposition  
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
1870-1880 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.0 
1880-1890 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.1 
1890-1900 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 
1900-1913 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.3 
1913-1929 1.9 0.5 1.1 0.3 
1929-1938 2.8 1.6 0.9 0.3 
1938-1950 2.5 1.2 0.9 0.3 
1950-1960 2.9 0.9 1.6 0.4 
1960-1970 2.5 0.7 1.3 0.4 
1970-1980 2.2 0.6 1.6 0.0 
1980-1990 0.7 0.3 0.6 -0.2 
1990-2000 0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.1 
2000-2007 1.8 0.4 0.9 0.6 
     
1870-1913 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.2 
1913-1980 2.4 0.9 1.2 0.3 
1980-2007 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.0 
     
1913-1950 2.3 1.0 1.0 0.3 
1950-1980 2.5 0.7 1.5 0.3 
     
1950-2007 1.8 0.5 1.1 0.2 
     
1870-2007 1.6 0.5 0.9 0.2 
 
Note: There small discrepancies between IHDI growth and its components’ 
contributions to growth due to rounding. 
Sources: See the text. 
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Table 5 Human Development across African Regions, 1870-2007: IHDI Estimates 
 
Panel A Levels     
 North Central  West East Southern 
1870 0.034 0.017 0.020 0.019 0.035 
1880 0.035 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.041 
1890 0.038 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.049 
1900 0.042 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.058 
1913 0.049 0.019 0.022 0.027 0.064 
1929 0.067 0.028 0.034 0.041 0.078 
1938 0.078 0.047 0.045 0.049 0.092 
1950 0.111 0.069 0.068 0.061 0.124 
1960 0.150 0.102 0.090 0.084 0.164 
1970 0.181 0.134 0.115 0.113 0.203 
1980 0.231 0.155 0.158 0.150 0.232 
1990 0.284 0.162 0.172 0.160 0.255 
2000 0.347 0.144 0.188 0.177 0.253 
2007 0.386 0.162 0.218 0.212 0.267 
      
Panel B Average Growth Rates (%)    
 North Central  West East Southern 
1870-1880 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.6 
1880-1890 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.8 1.7 
1890-1900 1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.9 1.6 
1900-1913 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.7 
1913-1929 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.3 
1929-1938 1.7 5.6 3.1 2.1 1.8 
1938-1950 2.9 3.3 3.4 1.8 2.4 
1950-1960 3.0 3.9 2.8 3.1 2.8 
1960-1970 1.9 2.7 2.4 3.0 2.1 
1970-1980 2.5 1.5 3.2 2.8 1.3 
1980-1990 2.0 0.4 0.8 0.6 1.0 
1990-2000 2.0 -1.2 0.9 1.0 -0.1 
2000-2007 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.6 0.8 
      
1870-1913 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.8 1.4 
1913-1980 2.3 3.1 2.9 2.6 1.9 
1980-2007 1.9 0.2 1.2 1.3 0.5 
      
1913-1950 2.2 3.5 3.1 2.2 1.8 
1950-1980 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.1 
      
1950-2007 2.2 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.4 
      
1870-2007 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5 
 
Sources: See the text. 
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Table 6 Human Development in African Countries, 1950-2007: IHDI Estimates 
 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 
North Africa  0.111 0.125 0.150 0.165 0.181 0.203 0.231 0.265 0.284 0.315 0.347 0.376 0.386 
Algeria 0.109 0.120 0.146 0.167 0.192 0.222 0.248 0.292 0.314 0.332 0.362 0.397 0.405 
Egypt 0.117 0.130 0.160 0.168 0.178 0.196 0.223 0.261 0.280 0.315 0.352 0.372 0.382 
Libya 0.099 0.123 0.157 0.201 0.252 0.283 0.319 0.348 0.372 0.419 0.462 0.488 0.502 
Mauritania 0.034 0.040 0.056 0.084 0.105 0.113 0.145 0.158 0.166 0.183 0.208 0.222 0.228 
Morocco 0.096 0.115 0.130 0.144 0.156 0.178 0.210 0.225 0.235 0.267 0.283 0.327 0.341 
Tunisia 0.111 0.125 0.151 0.183 0.209 0.233 0.263 0.297 0.317 0.345 0.369 0.440 0.451 
Central Africa  0.069 0.087 0.102 0.114 0.134 0.149 0.155 0.166 0.162 0.140 0.144 0.155 0.162 
Cameroon 0.069 0.075 0.093 0.107 0.147 0.164 0.190 0.214 0.203 0.184 0.210 0.218 0.219 
CAR 0.049 0.069 0.094 0.108 0.113 0.118 0.129 0.131 0.139 0.129 0.141 0.131 0.134 
Chad 0.029 0.040 0.058 0.067 0.071 0.081 0.080 0.106 0.116 0.099 0.116 0.147 0.146 
Congo 0.078 0.104 0.126 0.142 0.177 0.211 0.280 0.308 0.285 0.270 0.233 0.274 0.275 
Congo D.R. 0.072 0.095 0.109 0.119 0.135 0.149 0.144 0.146 0.142 0.106 0.105 0.112 0.122 
Equatorial Guinea 0.088 0.103 0.120 0.152 0.175 0.171 0.201 0.219 0.238 0.255 0.311 0.337 0.344 
Gabon 0.091 0.115 0.128 0.184 0.218 0.251 0.295 0.346 0.349 0.381 0.354 0.365 0.373 
West Africa 0.068 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.115 0.132 0.158 0.162 0.172 0.179 0.188 0.205 0.218 
Benin 0.052 0.066 0.079 0.090 0.104 0.121 0.143 0.151 0.159 0.178 0.198 0.222 0.229 
Burkina Faso 0.034 0.042 0.055 0.064 0.070 0.072 0.082 0.092 0.107 0.112 0.120 0.149 0.165 
Cape Verde 0.091 0.099 0.123 0.148 0.172 0.187 0.216 0.243 0.273 0.315 0.350 0.371 0.390 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.054 0.068 0.096 0.116 0.142 0.155 0.198 0.200 0.193 0.189 0.201 0.198 0.204 
Gambia 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.073 0.081 0.095 0.123 0.134 0.145 0.163 0.178 0.193 0.197 
Ghana 0.116 0.135 0.143 0.169 0.172 0.177 0.197 0.198 0.216 0.231 0.228 0.240 0.253 
Guinea 0.027 0.037 0.054 0.067 0.076 0.088 0.106 0.108 0.116 0.128 0.146 0.162 0.167 
Guinea-Bissau 0.031 0.047 0.061 0.079 0.090 0.105 0.112 0.120 0.133 0.147 0.153 0.157 0.161 
Liberia 0.071 0.085 0.096 0.116 0.132 0.140 0.138 0.139 0.143 0.158 0.208 0.207 0.215 
Mali 0.035 0.042 0.052 0.065 0.074 0.080 0.084 0.083 0.091 0.099 0.129 0.156 0.160 
Niger 0.029 0.032 0.040 0.059 0.067 0.069 0.080 0.077 0.082 0.084 0.083 0.118 0.126 
Nigeria 0.076 0.087 0.096 0.096 0.117 0.141 0.170 0.171 0.181 0.188 0.195 0.214 0.231 
Senegal 0.060 0.071 0.081 0.099 0.111 0.119 0.137 0.151 0.160 0.164 0.185 0.201 0.204 
Sierra Leone 0.050 0.058 0.069 0.077 0.086 0.093 0.120 0.134 0.127 0.118 0.114 0.144 0.151 
Togo 0.064 0.076 0.087 0.112 0.135 0.157 0.174 0.158 0.159 0.166 0.213 0.206 0.208 
East Africa 0.061 0.072 0.084 0.096 0.113 0.129 0.150 0.153 0.159 0.160 0.177 0.200 0.212 
Burundi 0.049 0.062 0.074 0.064 0.095 0.093 0.100 0.119 0.139 0.121 0.139 0.148 0.160 
Djibouti 0.077 0.088 0.099 0.108 0.118 0.126 0.158 0.169 0.170 0.177 0.178 0.198 0.203 
Ethiopia 0.032 0.037 0.044 0.058 0.078 0.088 0.105 0.105 0.112 0.117 0.132 0.165 0.178 
Kenya 0.101 0.113 0.126 0.140 0.164 0.197 0.235 0.243 0.257 0.245 0.225 0.232 0.241 
Rwanda 0.073 0.087 0.100 0.109 0.125 0.130 0.152 0.157 0.127 0.113 0.166 0.194 0.203 
Sudan 0.065 0.073 0.088 0.101 0.119 0.134 0.150 0.154 0.161 0.178 0.198 0.217 0.221 
Tanzania 0.054 0.076 0.092 0.104 0.117 0.141 0.163 0.155 0.158 0.150 0.162 0.201 0.221 
Uganda 0.101 0.110 0.115 0.126 0.134 0.138 0.140 0.153 0.154 0.155 0.198 0.216 0.234 
Southern Africa 0.124 0.143 0.164 0.182 0.203 0.218 0.232 0.244 0.255 0.261 0.253 0.259 0.267 
Angola 0.036 0.052 0.062 0.079 0.097 0.101 0.140 0.140 0.138 0.132 0.155 0.211 0.227 
Botswana 0.078 0.089 0.102 0.130 0.159 0.212 0.255 0.293 0.333 0.318 0.285 0.308 0.324 
Lesotho 0.104 0.119 0.135 0.168 0.176 0.197 0.227 0.243 0.270 0.279 0.253 0.236 0.241 
Madagascar 0.109 0.119 0.136 0.149 0.168 0.179 0.192 0.181 0.181 0.183 0.203 0.226 0.235 
Malawi 0.057 0.074 0.090 0.094 0.104 0.127 0.140 0.145 0.150 0.193 0.203 0.199 0.212 
Mauritius 0.206 0.240 0.276 0.301 0.310 0.339 0.338 0.364 0.399 0.414 0.453 0.491 0.500 
Mozambique 0.059 0.081 0.097 0.102 0.117 0.133 0.139 0.129 0.134 0.146 0.173 0.200 0.210 
Namibia 0.116 0.126 0.137 0.195 0.222 0.253 0.306 0.327 0.343 0.367 0.343 0.347 0.362 
South Africa 0.183 0.208 0.234 0.257 0.280 0.300 0.304 0.326 0.346 0.366 0.341 0.331 0.335 
Swaziland 0.087 0.107 0.129 0.163 0.197 0.225 0.255 0.285 0.291 0.304 0.272 0.250 0.254 
Zambia 0.103 0.118 0.139 0.160 0.184 0.193 0.200 0.205 0.203 0.173 0.158 0.184 0.193 
Zimbabwe 0.116 0.139 0.162 0.176 0.197 0.214 0.251 0.306 0.299 0.268 0.223 0.205 0.208 
SSA 0.081 0.095 0.108 0.121 0.139 0.154 0.173 0.179 0.185 0.187 0.194 0.209 0.220 
Africa 0.087 0.101 0.117 0.130 0.148 0.164 0.185 0.197 0.206 0.213 0.225 0.242 0.252 
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Table 7 Human Development in African Countries, 1950-2007: IHDI Growth Rates (%) 
 
 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007  1950-1980 1980-2007  1950-2007 
North Africa  3.0 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.5  2.5 1.9  2.2 
Algeria 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.4 1.6  2.7 1.8  2.3 
Egypt 3.2 1.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 1.2  2.2 2.0  2.1 
Libya 4.6 4.7 2.4 1.5 2.2 1.2  3.9 1.7  2.9 
Mauritania 5.1 6.3 3.3 1.3 2.3 1.3  4.9 1.7  3.4 
Morocco 3.0 1.8 2.9 1.1 1.9 2.6  2.6 1.8  2.2 
Tunisia 3.1 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.5 2.9  2.9 2.0  2.5 
Central Africa  3.9 2.7 1.5 0.4 -1.2 1.7  2.7 0.2  1.5 
Cameroon 3.0 4.6 2.5 0.7 0.3 0.6  3.4 0.5  2.0 
CAR 6.5 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.2 -0.8  3.2 0.2  1.8 
Chad 6.9 2.0 1.2 3.7 0.0 3.2  3.4 2.2  2.8 
Congo 4.7 3.4 4.6 0.2 -2.0 2.3  4.2 -0.1  2.2 
Congo D.R. 4.2 2.2 0.6 -0.1 -3.0 2.1  2.3 -0.6  0.9 
Equatorial Guinea 3.1 3.8 1.4 1.7 2.7 1.4  2.8 2.0  2.4 
Gabon 3.4 5.3 3.0 1.7 0.1 0.7  3.9 0.9  2.5 
West Africa 2.8 2.4 3.2 0.8 0.9 2.1  2.8 1.2  2.0 
Benin 4.1 2.7 3.2 1.1 2.2 2.1  3.4 1.8  2.6 
Burkina Faso 4.9 2.4 1.6 2.6 1.2 4.5  3.0 2.6  2.8 
Cape Verde 3.0 3.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 1.6  2.9 2.2  2.6 
Côte d'Ivoire 5.7 4.0 3.3 -0.3 0.4 0.2  4.3 0.1  2.3 
Gambia 1.9 3.0 4.2 1.7 2.0 1.5  3.0 1.7  2.4 
Ghana 2.0 1.9 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.5  1.8 0.9  1.4 
Guinea 7.1 3.4 3.3 0.9 2.3 1.9  4.6 1.7  3.2 
Guinea-Bissau 6.8 3.8 2.2 1.7 1.4 0.8  4.3 1.3  2.9 
Liberia 3.1 3.1 0.5 0.3 3.8 0.5  2.2 1.6  1.9 
Mali 4.1 3.5 1.2 0.8 3.6 3.1  2.9 2.4  2.7 
Niger 3.3 5.0 1.8 0.3 0.2 5.9  3.4 1.7  2.6 
Nigeria 2.4 2.0 3.7 0.7 0.8 2.4  2.7 1.1  2.0 
Senegal 3.1 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.4  2.8 1.5  2.2 
Sierra Leone 3.3 2.2 3.3 0.6 -1.1 4.1  2.9 0.9  1.9 
Togo 3.0 4.4 2.6 -0.9 3.0 -0.4  3.3 0.7  2.1 
East Africa 3.1 3.0 2.8 0.6 1.0 2.6  3.0 1.3  2.2 
Burundi 4.1 2.6 0.5 3.3 0.0 2.0  2.4 1.7  2.1 
Djibouti 2.5 1.7 2.9 0.7 0.5 1.9  2.4 0.9  1.7 
Ethiopia 3.3 5.8 3.0 0.7 1.6 4.3  4.0 2.0  3.0 
Kenya 2.2 2.6 3.6 0.9 -1.3 1.0  2.8 0.1  1.5 
Rwanda 3.1 2.3 1.9 -1.8 2.7 2.8  2.5 1.1  1.8 
Sudan 3.0 3.1 2.3 0.7 2.0 1.6  2.8 1.4  2.2 
Tanzania 5.3 2.4 3.3 -0.3 0.2 4.4  3.7 1.1  2.5 
Uganda 1.3 1.5 0.4 1.0 2.5 2.4  1.1 1.9  1.5 
Southern Africa 2.8 2.1 1.3 1.0 -0.1 0.8  2.1 0.5  1.4 
Angola 5.3 4.4 3.7 -0.2 1.2 5.5  4.5 1.8  3.2 
Botswana 2.7 4.4 4.7 2.7 -1.6 1.8  3.9 0.9  2.5 
Lesotho 2.6 2.7 2.5 1.7 -0.7 -0.7  2.6 0.2  1.5 
Madagascar 2.2 2.1 1.4 -0.6 1.2 2.1  1.9 0.7  1.4 
Malawi 4.6 1.5 2.9 0.7 3.0 0.7  3.0 1.6  2.3 
Mauritius 2.9 1.1 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.4  1.7 1.4  1.6 
Mozambique 4.9 1.9 1.7 -0.4 2.5 2.8  2.9 1.5  2.2 
Namibia 1.7 4.8 3.2 1.1 0.0 0.8  3.2 0.6  2.0 
South Africa 2.4 1.8 0.8 1.3 -0.2 -0.2  1.7 0.4  1.1 
Swaziland 3.9 4.3 2.6 1.3 -0.7 -1.0  3.6 0.0  1.9 
Zambia 3.0 2.8 0.9 0.2 -2.5 2.8  2.2 -0.1  1.1 
Zimbabwe 3.4 2.0 2.4 1.8 -2.9 -1.0  2.6 -0.7  1.0 
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Table 8 African Country Ranking in Human Development, 1950-2007: IHDI Estimates 
 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 
Mauritius 0.206 Mauritius 0.276 Mauritius 0.310 Mauritius 0.338 Mauritius 0.399 Libya 0.462 Libya 0.502 
South Africa 0.183 South Africa 0.234 South Africa 0.280 Libya 0.319 Libya 0.372 Mauritius 0.453 Mauritius 0.500 
Egypt 0.117 Zimbabwe 0.162 Libya 0.252 Namibia 0.306 Gabon 0.349 Tunisia 0.369 Tunisia 0.451 
Ghana 0.116 Egypt 0.160 Namibia 0.222 South Africa 0.304 South Africa 0.346 Algeria 0.362 Algeria 0.405 
Namibia 0.116 Libya 0.157 Gabon 0.218 Gabon 0.295 Namibia 0.343 Gabon 0.354 Cape Verde 0.390 
Zimbabwe 0.116 Tunisia 0.151 Tunisia 0.209 Congo 0.280 Botswana 0.333 Egypt 0.352 Egypt 0.382 
Tunisia 0.111 Algeria 0.146 Zimbabwe 0.197 Tunisia 0.263 Tunisia 0.317 Cape Verde 0.350 Gabon 0.373 
Algeria 0.109 Ghana 0.143 Swaziland 0.197 Swaziland 0.255 Algeria 0.314 Namibia 0.343 Namibia 0.362 
Madagascar 0.109 Zambia 0.139 Algeria 0.192 Botswana 0.255 Zimbabwe 0.299 South Africa 0.341 Equat. Guinea 0.344 
Lesotho 0.104 Namibia 0.137 Zambia 0.184 Zimbabwe 0.251 Swaziland 0.291 Equat. Guinea 0.311 Morocco 0.341 
Zambia 0.103 Madagascar 0.136 Egypt 0.178 Algeria 0.248 Congo 0.285 Botswana 0.285 South Africa 0.335 
Uganda 0.101 Lesotho 0.135 Congo 0.177 Kenya 0.235 Egypt 0.280 Morocco 0.283 Botswana 0.324 
Kenya 0.101 Morocco 0.130 Lesotho 0.176 Lesotho 0.227 Cape Verde 0.273 Swaziland 0.272 Congo 0.275 
Libya 0.099 Swaziland 0.129 Equat. Guinea 0.175 Egypt 0.223 Lesotho 0.270 Lesotho 0.253 Swaziland 0.254 
Morocco 0.096 Gabon 0.128 Ghana 0.172 Cape Verde 0.216 Kenya 0.257 Congo 0.233 Ghana 0.253 
Gabon 0.091 Congo 0.126 Cape Verde 0.172 Morocco 0.210 Equat. Guinea 0.238 Ghana 0.228 Kenya 0.241 
Cape Verde 0.091 Kenya 0.126 Madagascar 0.168 Equat. Guinea 0.201 Morocco 0.235 Kenya 0.225 Lesotho 0.241 
Equat. Guinea 0.088 Cape Verde 0.123 Kenya 0.164 Zambia 0.200 Ghana 0.216 Zimbabwe 0.223 Madagascar 0.235 
Swaziland 0.087 Equat. Guinea 0.120 Botswana 0.159 Côte d'Ivoire 0.198 Cameroon 0.203 Togo 0.213 Uganda 0.234 
Congo 0.078 Uganda 0.115 Morocco 0.156 Ghana 0.197 Zambia 0.203 Cameroon 0.210 Nigeria 0.231 
Botswana 0.078 Congo D.R. 0.109 Cameroon 0.147 Madagascar 0.192 Côte d'Ivoire 0.193 Mauritania 0.208 Benin 0.229 
Djibouti 0.077 Botswana 0.102 Côte d'Ivoire 0.142 Cameroon 0.190 Madagascar 0.181 Liberia 0.208 Mauritania 0.228 
Nigeria 0.076 Rwanda 0.100 Congo D.R. 0.135 Togo 0.174 Nigeria 0.181 Madagascar 0.203 Angola 0.227 
Rwanda 0.073 Djibouti 0.099 Togo 0.135 Nigeria 0.170 Djibouti 0.170 Malawi 0.203 Tanzania 0.221 
Congo D.R. 0.072 Mozambique 0.097 Uganda 0.134 Tanzania 0.163 Mauritania 0.166 Côte d'Ivoire 0.201 Sudan 0.221 
Liberia 0.071 Liberia 0.096 Liberia 0.132 Djibouti 0.158 Sudan 0.161 Benin 0.198 Cameroon 0.219 
Cameroon 0.069 Nigeria 0.096 Rwanda 0.125 Rwanda 0.152 Senegal 0.160 Uganda 0.198 Liberia 0.215 
Sudan 0.065 Côte d'Ivoire 0.096 Sudan 0.119 Sudan 0.150 Benin 0.159 Sudan 0.198 Malawi 0.212 
Togo 0.064 CAR 0.094 Djibouti 0.118 Mauritania 0.145 Togo 0.159 Nigeria 0.195 Mozambique 0.210 
Senegal 0.060 Cameroon 0.093 Nigeria 0.117 Congo D.R. 0.144 Tanzania 0.158 Senegal 0.185 Togo 0.208 
Mozambique 0.059 Tanzania 0.092 Mozambique 0.117 Benin 0.143 Uganda 0.154 Djibouti 0.178 Zimbabwe 0.208 
Malawi 0.057 Malawi 0.090 Tanzania 0.117 Angola 0.140 Malawi 0.150 Gambia 0.178 Côte d'Ivoire 0.204 
Tanzania 0.054 Sudan 0.088 CAR 0.113 Uganda 0.140 Gambia 0.145 Mozambique 0.173 Senegal 0.204 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.054 Togo 0.087 Senegal 0.111 Malawi 0.140 Liberia 0.143 Rwanda 0.166 Djibouti 0.203 
Benin 0.052 Senegal 0.081 Mauritania 0.105 Mozambique 0.139 Congo D.R. 0.142 Tanzania 0.162 Rwanda 0.203 
Gambia 0.050 Benin 0.079 Malawi 0.104 Liberia 0.138 Burundi 0.139 Zambia 0.158 Gambia 0.197 
Sierra Leone 0.050 Burundi 0.074 Benin 0.104 Senegal 0.137 CAR 0.139 Angola 0.155 Zambia 0.193 
Burundi 0.049 Sierra Leone 0.069 Angola 0.097 CAR 0.129 Angola 0.138 Guinea-Bissau 0.153 Ethiopia 0.178 
CAR 0.049 Angola 0.062 Burundi 0.095 Gambia 0.123 Mozambique 0.134 Guinea 0.146 Guinea 0.167 
Angola 0.036 Guinea-Bissau 0.061 Guinea-Bissau 0.090 Sierra Leone 0.120 Guinea-Bissau 0.133 CAR 0.141 Burkina Faso 0.165 
Mali 0.035 Gambia 0.060 Sierra Leone 0.086 Guinea-Bissau 0.112 Rwanda 0.127 Burundi 0.139 Guinea-Bissau 0.161 
Burkina Faso 0.034 Chad 0.058 Gambia 0.081 Guinea 0.106 Sierra Leone 0.127 Ethiopia 0.132 Mali 0.160 
Mauritania 0.034 Mauritania 0.056 Ethiopia 0.078 Ethiopia 0.105 Chad 0.116 Mali 0.129 Burundi 0.160 
Ethiopia 0.032 Burkina Faso 0.055 Guinea 0.076 Burundi 0.100 Guinea 0.116 Burkina Faso 0.120 Sierra Leone 0.151 
Guinea-Bissau 0.031 Guinea 0.054 Mali 0.074 Mali 0.084 Ethiopia 0.112 Chad 0.116 Chad 0.146 
Niger 0.029 Mali 0.052 Chad 0.071 Burkina Faso 0.082 Burkina Faso 0.107 Sierra Leone 0.114 CAR 0.134 
Chad 0.029 Ethiopia 0.044 Burkina Faso 0.070 Chad 0.080 Mali 0.091 Congo D.R. 0.105 Niger 0.126 
Guinea 0.027 Niger 0.040 Niger 0.067 Niger 0.080 Niger 0.082 Niger 0.083 Congo D.R. 0.122 
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Table 9a Human Development Growth Decomposition: Country Ranking, 1950-2007 
    
IHDI Growth and Its Composition, 1950-1980 (%)  IHDI Growth and Its Composition, 1980-2007 (%) 
  Growth Decomposition    Growth Decomposition 
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income   IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
Mauritania 4.9 1.1 3.1 0.7  Burkina Faso 2.6 0.5 1.7 0.4 
Guinea 4.6 1.0 2.6 1.1  Mali 2.4 0.5 1.6 0.3 
Angola 4.5 0.9 3.6 -0.1  Chad 2.2 0.0 1.0 1.1 
Côte d'Ivoire 4.3 1.2 2.8 0.4  Cape Verde 2.2 0.5 0.9 0.7 
Guinea-Bissau 4.3 0.6 2.3 1.4  Tunisia 2.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 
Congo 4.2 1.1 2.7 0.4  Equatorial Guinea 2.0 0.4 0.5 1.0 
Ethiopia 4.0 0.8 2.5 0.7  Egypt 2.0 0.7 1.0 0.3 
Botswana 3.9 0.9 1.4 1.6  Ethiopia 2.0 0.6 1.1 0.2 
Gabon 3.9 0.9 2.7 0.3  Uganda 1.9 0.1 1.2 0.6 
Libya 3.9 0.9 2.0 1.0  Algeria 1.8 0.7 1.1 0.0 
Tanzania 3.7 0.8 2.4 0.4  Morocco 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.2 
Swaziland 3.6 1.1 1.7 0.7  Angola 1.8 0.4 1.1 0.3 
Chad 3.4 1.1 2.9 -0.6  Benin 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.1 
Cameroon 3.4 0.9 2.0 0.4  Gambia 1.7 0.5 1.2 0.0 
Benin 3.4 1.1 2.3 0.0  Burundi 1.7 0.2 1.8 -0.3 
Niger 3.4 0.5 2.6 0.2  Niger 1.7 0.7 1.4 -0.5 
Togo 3.3 1.1 1.6 0.5  Libya 1.7 0.8 1.2 -0.4 
CAR 3.2 0.8 2.4 0.0  Guinea 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.1 
Namibia 3.2 1.1 1.9 0.2  Mauritania 1.7 0.2 1.3 0.2 
Gambia 3.0 1.3 1.3 0.4  Liberia 1.6 0.6 1.4 -0.3 
Malawi 3.0 0.6 1.4 1.0  Malawi 1.6 0.4 1.0 0.1 
Burkina Faso 3.0 0.8 1.7 0.5  Mozambique 1.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 
Sierra Leone 2.9 1.0 1.5 0.4  Senegal 1.5 0.5 0.9 0.1 
Mali 2.9 0.6 1.8 0.5  Mauritius 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.4 
Tunisia 2.9 0.9 1.5 0.5  Sudan 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 
Cape Verde 2.9 0.6 1.6 0.7  Guinea-Bissau 1.3 0.5 1.1 -0.2 
Mozambique 2.9 0.7 2.1 0.0  Nigeria 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 
Kenya 2.8 0.9 1.5 0.4  Tanzania 1.1 0.3 0.6 0.2 
Sudan 2.8 0.7 2.0 0.1  Rwanda 1.1 0.2 0.8 0.0 
Equatorial Guinea 2.8 0.6 1.3 0.8  Djibouti 0.9 0.4 0.7 -0.2 
Senegal 2.8 0.7 2.1 0.0  Ghana 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.2 
Algeria 2.7 0.9 1.5 0.4  Botswana 0.9 -0.4 0.8 0.5 
Nigeria 2.7 0.6 1.7 0.4  Gabon 0.9 0.3 0.8 -0.2 
Lesotho 2.6 0.9 0.5 1.2  Sierra Leone 0.9 0.4 0.9 -0.5 
Morocco 2.6 0.8 1.6 0.2  Madagascar 0.7 0.7 0.4 -0.3 
Zimbabwe 2.6 0.9 1.2 0.5  Togo 0.7 0.4 0.8 -0.5 
Rwanda 2.5 0.4 1.6 0.5  Namibia 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Burundi 2.4 0.5 1.2 0.7  Cameroon 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Djibouti 2.4 1.0 1.3 0.1  South Africa 0.4 -0.3 0.6 0.0 
Congo D.R. 2.3 0.5 1.8 0.1  Lesotho 0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.4 
Zambia 2.2 0.8 1.1 0.3  CAR 0.2 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 
Liberia 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.1  Côte d'Ivoire 0.1 0.1 0.4 -0.3 
Egypt 2.2 0.8 0.9 0.5  Kenya 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.1 
Madagascar 1.9 0.6 1.2 0.1  Swaziland 0.0 -0.5 0.4 0.1 
Ghana 1.8 0.6 1.1 0.0  Congo -0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.1 
South Africa 1.7 0.6 0.9 0.2  Zambia -0.1 -0.4 0.4 -0.1 
Mauritius 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.2  Congo D.R. -0.6 0.1 0.6 -1.3 
Uganda 1.1 0.6 0.7 -0.2  Zimbabwe -0.7 -0.9 0.5 -0.3 
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Table 9b Human Development Growth Decomposition: Country Ranking, 1950-2007 
 
IHDI Growth and Its Composition, 1950-2007 (%) 
  Growth Decomposition 
 IHDI Life Expectancy Education Income 
Mauritania 3.4 0.7 2.2 0.5 
Guinea 3.2 0.9 1.7 0.6 
Angola 3.2 0.7 2.4 0.1 
Ethiopia 3.0 0.7 1.9 0.4 
Guinea-Bissau 2.9 0.6 1.7 0.6 
Libya 2.9 0.8 1.6 0.4 
Chad 2.8 0.6 2.0 0.2 
Burkina Faso 2.8 0.7 1.7 0.4 
Mali 2.7 0.6 1.7 0.4 
Benin 2.6 0.8 1.7 0.1 
Niger 2.6 0.6 2.0 -0.1 
Cape Verde 2.6 0.6 1.3 0.7 
Botswana 2.5 0.3 1.1 1.0 
Gabon 2.5 0.6 1.8 0.0 
Tunisia 2.5 0.8 1.3 0.4 
Tanzania 2.5 0.6 1.6 0.3 
Gambia 2.4 0.9 1.3 0.2 
Equatorial Guinea 2.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.3 0.6 1.6 0.0 
Malawi 2.3 0.5 1.2 0.6 
Algeria 2.3 0.8 1.3 0.2 
Mozambique 2.2 0.5 1.5 0.2 
Morocco 2.2 0.8 1.2 0.2 
Congo 2.2 0.4 1.6 0.2 
Senegal 2.2 0.6 1.5 0.0 
Sudan 2.2 0.6 1.4 0.1 
Burundi 2.1 0.3 1.5 0.2 
Egypt 2.1 0.7 0.9 0.4 
Togo 2.1 0.8 1.2 0.0 
Cameroon 2.0 0.5 1.3 0.2 
Namibia 2.0 0.6 1.2 0.2 
Nigeria 2.0 0.4 1.3 0.3 
Sierra Leone 1.9 0.7 1.3 0.0 
Liberia 1.9 0.6 1.5 -0.1 
Swaziland 1.9 0.3 1.1 0.4 
Rwanda 1.8 0.3 1.2 0.3 
CAR 1.8 0.4 1.6 -0.2 
Djibouti 1.7 0.7 1.0 -0.1 
Mauritius 1.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 
Kenya 1.5 0.4 0.9 0.2 
Lesotho 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.8 
Uganda 1.5 0.4 0.9 0.2 
Ghana 1.4 0.4 0.8 0.1 
Madagascar 1.4 0.6 0.8 -0.1 
Zambia 1.1 0.2 0.8 0.1 
South Africa 1.1 0.2 0.7 0.1 
Zimbabwe 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 
Congo D.R. 0.9 0.3 1.2 -0.6 
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Table 10 Determinants of Human Development Growth, 1950-2007 
 
Dependent Variable lHDI_GR      
 [1]  [2]  [3]  
Constant -6.398 (-5.858) -6.105 (-5.770) -0.938 (-1.841) 
IHDI (log) -4.256 (-7.828) -4.306 (-8.189) -1.529 (-7.793) 
SYNDROME   -0.843 (-4.164) -0.731 (-4.237) 
RR     0.342 (2.215) 
COAST     0.399 (2.461) 
NORTH     0.539 (2.317) 
COLONIAL     -0.102 (-1.015) 
       
Adjusted-R squared 0.501  0.533  0.503  
S.E. of regression 1.188  1.148  1.185  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.889  1.977  1.986  
F-statistic 6.426  7.069  27.419  
Number of observations 288  288  288  
       
Notes: Pooled Least Squares have been used.     
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance   
t-ratios in brackets       
Equations (1) and (2) cross-section and period fixed effects (dummy variables)  
Equation (3) period fixed effects (dummy variables)    
       
IHDI_GR: IHDI logarithmic growth rate (see text)     
IHDI: Improved Human Development Index (logs) (see text)    
SYNDROME: takes value 1 when a syndrome exists and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell 2008) 
RR: value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008)  
NORTH: value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise   
(African Bank of Development)      
COLONIAL: takes value 2 when a country was a British colony, 1 if it was French colony,   
and 0 otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002)     
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Figure 1 Human Development in Africa: IHDI and Hybrid and ‘old’ HDI, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 1 
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Figure 2 Human Development in SSA: IHDI and Hybrid and ‘old’ HDI, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 1 
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Figure 3 Relative Human Development in Africa: IHDI and hybrid and ‘old' HDI,  
               1870-2007 (World = 1) 
Sources: Table 1 and Prados de la Escosura (2011). 
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Figure 4 Relative Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: IHDI and hybrid 
                 and ‘old’ HDI, 1870-2007 (World = 1) 
Sources: Table 1 and Prados de la Escosura (2011). 
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Figure 5 IHDI across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 3 
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Figure 6 Relative IHDI across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 (OECD = 1) 
Sources: Table 3 and Prados de la Escosura (2011). 
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Figure 7 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 3 
 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
1870-1880 1880-1890 1890-1900 1900-1913 1913-1929 1929-1938 1938-1950 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007
Life Expectancy Education Income  
Figure 8 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 4 
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Figure 9 Life Expectancy Index across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text for Africa and Prados de la Escosura (2011) for the rest. 
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Figure 10 Relative Life Expectancy Index across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 
                  (OECD = 1) 
Sources: See the text for Africa and Prados de la Escosura (2011) for the rest. 
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Figure 11 Education Index across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text for Africa and Prados de la Escosura (2011) for the rest. 
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Figure 12 Relative Education Index across Developing Regions, 1870-2007 
                  (OECD = 1) 
Sources: See the text for Africa and Prados de la Escosura (2011) for the rest. 
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Figure 13 Human Development in Sub-Saharan and North Africa: IHDI, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 5 
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Figure 14 Human Development in Sub-Saharan African Regions: IHDI, 1870-2007 
Sources: Table 5 
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Figure 15 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in North Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 16 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in Central Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 17 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in West Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 18 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in East Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 19 IHDI Growth and its Decomposition in Southern Africa, 1870-2007 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 20 IHDI Growth Decomposition, 1950-1980: Country Ranking (%) 
Sources: Table 9a. 
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Figure 21 IHDI Growth Decomposition, 1980-2007: Country Ranking (%) 
Sources: Table 9a. 
 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Ma
uri
tan
ia
Gu
ine
a
An
go
la
Eth
iop
ia
Gu
ine
a-B
iss
au
Lib
ya
Ch
ad
Bu
rki
na
 Fa
so Ma
li
Be
nin Nig
er
Ca
pe
 Ve
rde
Bo
tsw
an
a
Ga
bo
n
Tu
nis
ia
Ta
nz
an
ia
Ga
mb
ia
Eq
ua
tor
ial
 Gu
ine
a
Cô
te 
d'I
vo
ire
Ma
law
i
Alg
eri
a
Mo
zam
biq
ue
Mo
roc
co
Co
ng
o
Se
ne
ga
l
Su
da
n
Bu
run
di
Eg
yp
t
To
go
Ca
me
roo
n
Na
mi
bia
Nig
eri
a
Sie
rra
 Le
on
e
Lib
eri
a
Sw
azi
lan
d
Rw
an
da CA
R
Dji
bu
ti
Ma
uru
tiu
s
Ke
ny
a
Les
oth
o
Ug
an
da
Gh
an
a
Ma
da
ga
sca
r
Za
mb
ia
So
uth
 Af
ric
a
Zim
ba
bw
e
Co
ng
o D
.R.
Life Expectancy Education Income  
 
Figure 22 IHDI Growth Decomposition, 1950-2007: Country Ranking (%) 
Sources: Table 9b. 
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Figure 23 IHDI Dispersion in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2007: unweighted 
and population-weighted coefficient of variation 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 24 Life Expectancy Index: Dispersion in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-
2007 (unweighted and population-weighted coefficient of variation) 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 25 Education Index: Dispersion in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2007 
(unweighted and population-weighted coefficient of variation) 
Sources: See the text. 
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Figure 26 Income Index: Dispersion in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1950-2007 
(unweighted and population-weighted coefficient of variation) 
Sources: See the text. 
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Appendix A. The Data 
Life Expectancy at birth 
Life expectancy is defined in the “Technical Notes” to the United Nations 
(2000), Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement 1948-1997 as “the average 
number of years of life which would remain for males and females reaching the ages 
specified if they continued to be subjected to the same mortality experienced in the 
year(s) to which these life expectancies refer”. In the Life Tables, estimates are based 
upon the assumption that “the theoretical cohort is subject, throughout its existence, 
to the age-specific mortality rates observed at a particular time. Thus, the levels of 
mortality prevailing at the time a life table is constructed are assumed to remain 
unchanged in the future until all members of the cohort have died”. Lack of data 
implied that some strong explicit assumptions had to be introduced. 
The United Nations’ Demographic Yearbook Historical Supplement (United 
Nations 2000), from 1950 onwards, and the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP 
2010), from 1980, provide the database that, for the pre-1950 period comes from Riley 
(2005b), unless a reference is made below to a specific country’s sources. 
Algeria, 1930s, Riley (2005b); 1920s, assumed to be the same as Tunisia’s. 
Angola, 1938, Riley (2005b). 
Benin, 1938, Riley (2005b). 
Botswana (1870-1938) assumed to be identical to Namibia. 
Djibouti (1938) assumed to be equal to Sudan’s. 
Libya (1929-1938), assumed to be identical to Egypt’s. 
Cameroon, 1929 and 1933, and 1938 (assumed to be equal to the lower bound 
estimate for 1950), Riley (2005b). 
Angola, Benin, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Niger, Sudan, Togo, 1929-
1933, assumed to be as Nigeria’s. 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Congo, D.R. Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, 1929-1933, assumed to be as in Ghana. 
Côte d’Ivoire, 1938, Riley (2005b). 
Egypt, 1929-1938, Fargues (1986); 1925, assumed to be similar to Tunisia’s. 
Ethiopia, 1938, Riley (2005b). 
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Ghana, 1920, Riley (2005b), 1933, Bourguignon and Morrison (2002). 
Kenya, Riley (2005b) provides an estimate of 23.5 years for the 1930s. Thus, the 25 
years historical minimum value was assigned to the pre-1938 period. 
Lesotho, Madagascar, and Malawi, 1925-1933, assumed to be as in Mauritius. 
Mauritius, 1920s, Riley (2205b); 1930s, assumed to be the same as in 1942-6, UN 
(1993). 
Morocco, 1925-1938, assumed to be as Tunisia’s. 
Mozambique, 1929-1938, assumed to be as in Angola’s. 
Namibia, 1870-1900, assumed to evolve as South Africa; 1900, assumed to be the 
same as for blacks in Cape Colony from Simkins et al. (1989); 1938, Notkola et al. 
(2000) 161, Northern Namibia figure adjusted with the ratio all Namibia to Northern 
Namibia c. 1960. It does not change over 1900-38. 
Nigeria, 1929-1933, average of Ayeni (1976) for 1931, cited in Riley (2005b). 
Senegal, 1938, average of Riley (2005b). 
South Africa, 1880-1925, Simkins et al. (1989); 1929-1938, van Tonder and van Eeden 
(1975), cited in Riley (2005b). 
Tunisia, 1920s, Riley (2005b); 1930s, is assumed to be the same as Algeria’s. 
Uganda, 1930s (c 1935), 23.9 (Riley 2005b), so I have assigned the minimum historical 
value of 25 years over 1850-1938. 
Zambia, 1929-1938, assumed to be the same as Zimbabwe’s. 
Zimbabwe, 1930s, 26.4 Riley (2005b). I have assigned the minimum goalpost over 
1850-1929. 
Literacy 
The rate of adult literacy is defined as the percentage of the population aged 15 
years or over who is able to read and write. While, from a conceptual point of view, 
there are no objections to the UNESCO definition of a literate person, namely, those 
“who can, with understanding, both read and write a short simple statement on his 
everyday life” (quoted in Nilsson 1999: 278), assessing a person’s literacy is quite a 
different issue.  
Most data from 1950 onwards come from UNESCO (1970, 2002) and the World 
Bank (2010), and since 1980 from the Human Development Report (UNDP 2009), 
completed with data from Banks (2010), Hayami and Ruttan (1985), and Easterly 
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(1999). Data for Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, 1970-
80, come from Ouane and Amon-Tanoh (1990). Pre-1950 figures are mainly taken from 
UNESCO (1953, 1957) and Flora (1973) 
In the absence of estimates, literacy rates have been projected backwards with 
the rate of primary enrolment or with years of primary education (from Morrisson and 
Murtin 2009). Also, for the post-1960, when data were lacking, the literacy rate has 
been derived by assuming the illiteracy rate to be identical to the share of population 
without schooling, from Barro and Lee (2002, 2010) and Cohen and Soto (2007). 
Literacy rates have been projected backwards with the rate of primary 
enrolment for Algeria (1870-80, 1930s), Burkina Faso (1929-19308), Burundi (1929-
1938), Cape Verde (1929-1938), Chad (1925-1938), Congo (1929-1938), Congo D. R. 
(1929-1938), Djibouti (1938), Equatorial Guinea (1929-1938) Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(1938), The Gambia (1929-1933), Ghana (1870-1938), Guinea-Bissau (1938), Guinea 
(1913-1938), Kenya (1920-1938), Lesotho (1890-1938), Liberia (1890-1938), Mauritius 
(1870-1933), Namibia (1913-1938), Nigeria (1900-1938), Réunion (1900-1938), Rwanda 
(1929-1938), Seychelles (1900-1938), Sierra Leone (1870-1938), South Africa (1925-
1933), Sudan (1913-1938), Swaziland (1938), Tanzania (1920-1938), Togo (1929-1938), 
Tunisia (1900-1925), Uganda (1900-1938),  Zambia (1900-1938), and Zimbabwe (1900-
1938). 
Literacy rates have been projected backwards with years of primary education 
for the population above 15 years (Morrisson and Murtin 2009) for Angola (1870-
1938), Benin (1870-1938), Botswana (1900-1938), Cameroon (1870-1938), Côte 
d’Ivoire (1870-1938), Eritrea and Ethiopia (1870-1933), Kenya (1870-1913), Lesotho 
(1870-1880), Madagascar (1870-1938), Malawi (1870-1938), Mali (1870-1938),  
Mozambique (1870-1880), Morocco (1870-1900), Senegal (1870-1880), and Tunisia 
(1870-1890).  
Botswana (1870-1900) and Namibia (1870-1900) have been assumed to evolve 
along South Africa, Swaziland (1870-1933), as Lesotho’s. Libya (1870-1900) is assumed 
to be as Egypt’s. Djibouti (1870-1933), was assumed to evolve along Sudan.  
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Enrolment 
Figures on enrolment rates, apparently straightforward, present difficulties of 
interpretation. The usual measurement procedure is to divide the number of students 
by the relevant school-age population cohort, for example, primary enrolment rate as 
the share of children receiving primary education over population aged 5 to 14 years, 
keeping this yardstick fixed over time. This ways the unadjusted (primary) enrolment 
rate is obtained. Such age span is, however, longer than primary schooling, leading to 
an under-estimate. Even worse, comparability is fraught with difficulties as the length 
of primary or secondary schooling changes across countries and over time, and, 
therefore, biases of an unknown sign are introduced (Benavot and Riddle 1988: 195; 
Nilsson 1999: 282). Alas, up to the mid-twentieth century, the only kind of enrolment 
rate that can be easily computed for a large number of countries and over a long time-
span is the unadjusted one. Gross enrolment rates, in which the denominator is 
adjusted to the age bracket for each type of schooling (primary, secondary …) are 
provided for the present by UNESCO, OECD, and the World Bank. The difficulty here is 
that enrolment rates above 100 percent can appear, as under-age and/or over-age 
students are included in the numerator. Eliminating them is, thus, required to obtain 
the net enrolment rate.  
In our case, since the rate of unadjusted total enrolment includes primary, 
secondary, and tertiary enrolment numbers in the numerator and the population aged 
5-24 in the denominator, differences between gross and net rates are negligible. The 
resulting unadjusted rates tend to under-estimate gross enrolment rates, as 
historically education was not extended to population aged 24 years. Using the ratio 
between gross all enrolment rates and the unadjusted rates for 1980, I corrected the 
bias in my historical, pre-1980 estimates. 
The relevant population was derived as follows. Firstly, I computed the share of 
population aged 5-24 (and 5-14) over total population at census years from Mitchell 
(2003) that was,  then, interpolated log-linearly to derive yearly series and, finally, its 
result multiplied by total population figures (see below). The population share of those 
aged 5-24 years of age for missing countries has been replaced with that of a 
neighbour country with a similar demographic transition. Thus, Nigeria’s shares have 
also been accepted for Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo. South Africa’s 
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have been adopted for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. Mali’s shares have 
been adopted for Burkina Faso, CAR, Chad, Congo, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal. Uganda’s, in turn, are used for Burundi, Congo 
D.R., and Rwanda. Then, Ghana’s are employed for Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Kenya’s for Somalia. Lastly, Mozambique’s were accepted for 
Comoros and Madagascar, Egypt’s for Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan, Algeria’s for Libya, 
and Tanzania’s for Malawi. 
For the pre-World War II era, Benavot and Riddle (1998) and Frankema (2011), 
and Lindert (2004), estimates of primary enrolment rates, and primary plus secondary 
education enrolment rates, respectively, have been used in the absence of direct 
estimates.  
Occasionally, the total (that is, primary, secondary, and tertiary) enrolment rate 
for nineteenth and early twentieth century countries has been obtained by adjusting 
the primary or primary and secondary enrolment ratio with the ratio resulting from 
dividing the share of population aged 5-14 years of age by the share of population 
aged 5-24. This crude procedure implies the assumption that secondary and tertiary 
enrolment numbers represent a negligible proportion of the relevant population 
cohort. In such cases, all enrolment rates have been derived with primary enrolment 
rates provided by UNESCO (1953, 1957) [U], Benavot and Riddle (1988) []B&R] and 
Frankema (2011) [F], adjusted with the ratio of those aged 5-14 years to those aged 5-
24 years, for the following countries and years: for Angola (F), 1890-1929; Benin 
(B&R,F), 1890-1938; Botswana (F,U),  1890-1938, 1955-1960; Burkina Faso (B&R,F), 
1913-1950; Burundi (F,U) 1929-50; Cameroon (B&R), 1890-1933; CAR (B&R,F), 1900-
1950; Chad(B&R), 1900-1938; Congo (B&R,F), 1900-1950; Congo, D.R. (U), 1929-1955; 
Côte d’Ivoire, (B&R,F),1900-1950, 1960; Djibouti (F), 1938-1960; Egypt (B&R), 1890-
1900; Equatorial Guinea (F), 1938, 1955-1965; Ethiopia (F), 1938;  Gabon (B&R,F), 
1900-1950; The Gambia (B&R,F), 1900-1938, 1955-1960; Ghana (F), 1870, 1890; 
Guinea (B&R,F), 1913-1950, 1960; Guinea-Bissau (F), 1938-1960; Kenya (B&R), 1920, 
1938; Lesotho (B&R,F) 1890-1939, 1955-1960; Madagascar (B&R,U), 1920-1938; 
Malawi (F), 1900-1938; Mali (B&R), 1913-1933; Mauritania (B&R), 1913-1938; 
Mauritius (B&R), 1870-1900, 1929, 1938; Mozambique (B&R), 1938; Namibia (B&R,F), 
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1913-1960; Niger (B&R,F), 1913-1938; Nigeria (B&R,F), 1920-1950, 1960; Réunion 
(B&R,U), 1900-1950; Rwanda (U,F), 1929-1950; Senegal (B&R,F), 1913-1960; Seychelles 
(B&R,U), 1900-1950; Sierra Leone (F), 1870-1890, 1950; Somalia (F,U), 1938-1950; 
Sudan (B&R), 1913-1933; Swaziland (F,U), 1938-1955; Tanzania (B&R,F) 1920, 1938, 
1960; Togo (B&R,U) 1913-1955; Uganda (F,B&R,U), 1900-1955; Zambia (F), 1900-1955; 
Zimbabwe (F), 1900, 1938-1960.  
For those countries for which no evidence on enrolment was available at given 
dates the closer enrolment rates have been projected backwards with the average 
years of schooling among the population above 15 (Morrisson and Murtin 2009). This 
procedure has been applied to Egypt (1870-1880), Kenya (1870-1913), Madagascar 
(1870-1900), Malawi (1870-1890), Mozambique (1870-1920), and Tunisia (1870-1890). 
In the absence of enrolment data for particular countries, I have assumed they 
evolved as a neighbouring country or one with similar features. Thus, Djibouti (1913-
1933) was assumed to move along Sudan, and Libya (1870-1938) as Egypt. Enrolment 
rates for Botswana (1870-1890), Lesotho (1870-1880) and Namibia (1870-1900) have 
been derived with the rate of variation of South Africa over the relevant period, and 
Swaziland (1870-1933) with Lesotho’s. Also, it was assumed that Guinea-Bissau (1965-
1970) moved along Senegal, The Gambia (1870-1890) as Ghana, and Tanzania (1890-
1913) as Uganda. 
Per Capita GDP 
For North Africa, Algeria, 1870-1950, estimates come from Maddison (2006: 
577-580). I interpolated levels for 1890, 1900, 1925, and 1938. For Egypt, 1870-1950, 
Maddison (2006: 577) estimates were used. Pamuk (2006) and Yousef (2002) also 
provide estimates. The former figures match closely Maddison’s estimates. The latter 
suggest too low levels for 1870-1913. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the only countries for 
which estimates were available are Ghana (Maddison 2006) and South Africa, for 
which I deflated nominal GDP estimates for 1913-1950 (Stadler 1963) with Alvaredo 
and Atkinson (2010) price index, and used population figures from Feinstein (2005: 
257-8) to derive per capita GDP. Then, the estimates were projected backwards to 
1880 with Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) conjectures while Maddison (2010) 
guessestimates for 1870 was accepted.  As for the rest of the countries, I used the 
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panel regression approach exposed above.  The econometric tests and results are 
provided in Appendix B. 
Population 
All figures are adjusted to refer to mid-year and to take into account the 
territorial changes and are derived from Maddison (2010), from 1950 onwards. Pre-
1950 data come from Smits (private communication) for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
completed with Banks (2010), for Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, and Sierra Leone; Fargues 
(1986), for Algeria and Tunisia, and Feinstein (2005) for South Africa. Missing 
observations for Sub-Saharan African countries in the late 19th century derived by 
assuming the average growth rate for countries in the region. 
Main regions 
These five regions are defined according the African Development Bank. North 
Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. Central Africa 
contains Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. East Africa comprises Burundi, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. Lack of data at each benchmark excluded Comoros, Seychelles, and Somalia 
form the region population-weighted averages. Ethiopia includes Eritrea. West Africa 
comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea‑Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Lack of 
data prevents the inclusion of São Tomé and Principe. Southern Africa consists of 
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix B 
Estimating GDP Indirectly  
 
I have investigated the order of integration of the variables used (excluding the 
dummies) in the estimate with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) (Table B-1). All 
variables are integrated of order zero, I (0), that is, its level does not contain a unit 
root. The hypothesis of a unitary root is rejected at the 1 per cent confidence level.  
 
Table B-1 Variables in the Model: Order of Integration 
 
Variables (logs) ADF test level Critical value 1% level Order of  integration  
Y * -5.601 -3.447 I(0)  
ITT *  -6.213 -3.447 I(0)  
     
Notes: * The ADF level tests have been considered with constant  
   
 Y: Per Capita GDP (1990 Geary-Khamis $) from Maddison (2010)  
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head. Income Terms of trade were computed by deflating  
African countries’ nominal export values with the industrial countries’ export unit values 
(IMF 2003) and, then, divided by the countries’ population (Maddison 2010) 
 
Table B-2 Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.     
Y 1370.69 1280.86     
ITT 266.48 700.06     
RR 0.28 0.45     
COAST 0.65 0.48     
NORTH 0.12 0.32     
COLONIAL 1.23 0.74     
      
Y: Per Capita GDP ((1990 Geary-Khamis $) (in logs) (Maddison 2010)  
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head (in logs) (IMF 2003 and Maddison 2010)  
RR: takes value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
NORTH: value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise 
(African Development Bank)     
COLONIAL: takes value 2 when a country was a British colony, 1 if it was French colony,  
and 0 otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002)    
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Table B-3 Econometric Estimate 
 
Dependent Variable log(Y)      
Constant 6.283 (48.696)     
log (ITT) -0.576 (-6.758)     
log(ITT)2 0.051 (6.718)     
RR -0.104 (-2.217)     
COAST 0.336 (9.833)     
NORTH 0.317 (5.806)     
COLONIAL 0.082 (2.987)     
log(ITT)*TREND 0.002 (7.323)     
AR(1) -0.109 (-2.296)     
       
Adjusted-R squared 0.732      
S.E. of regression 0.345      
Durbin-Watson stat 1.993      
 F-statistic 132.568      
No. of observations 386      
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares have been used.     
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance   
t-ratios in brackets       
       
Y: Per Capita GDP ((1990 Geary-Khamis $) (in logs) (Maddison 2010)   
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head (in logs) (IMF 2003 and Maddison 2010)  
RR: takes value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: takes value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
NORTH: takes value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise  
(African Bank of Development)      
COLONIAL: takes value 2 when a country was a British colony, 1 if it was French colony,  
and 0 otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002)     
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Appendix C 
IHDI Determinants: Econometric Estimates 
I have analysed the order of integration of the variables used (excluding dummies), 
with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) (Table C-1). All variables are integrated of 
order zero, I (0.  The hypothesis of a unitary root is rejected at the 1 per cent 
confidence level.  
 
Table C-1 Variables in the Model: Order of Integration 
 
Variables ADF test level Critical value 1% level Order of  integration 
IHDI_GR ** -14.113 -3.990 I(0) 
IHDI (in logs) **  -18.682 -3.990 I(0) 
    
Notes: ADF level tests have been considered with constant (*)  
and with constant and linear trend (**).  
  
IHDI_GR: IHDI logarithmic growth rate  
IHDI: Improved Human Development Index  
Sources: See the text.   
 
Table C-2 Summary Statistics 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.     
IHDI_GR 2.134 1.681     
IHDI (in logs) -2.005 0.565     
SYNDROME 0.465 0.500     
RR 0.354 0.479     
COAST 0.688 0.464     
NORTH 0.125 0.331     
COLONIAL 1.146 0.765     
      
IHDI_GR: IHDI logarithmic growth rate (see the text)    
IHDI: Improved Human Development Index (see the text)   
SYNDROME: takes value 1 when a syndrome exists and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell 2008) 
RR: takes value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: takes value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
NORTH: takes value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise 
(African Bank of Development)     
COLONIAL: takes value 2 when a country was a British colony, 1 if it was French colony,  
and 0 otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002)    
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Appendix D 
Original Values of Social Indicators and GDP per Head in Africa and its Main Regions 
 
Table D-1 Life Expectancy at Birth in Africa and its Main Regions (years) 
        
 Africa North Central Southern West East SSA 
1870 25.2 25.0 25.0 26.1 25.0 25.0 25.3 
1880 25.3 25.0 25.0 26.9 25.0 25.0 25.5 
1890 25.5 25.0 25.0 27.7 25.0 25.0 25.7 
1900 25.9 26.0 25.0 28.8 25.0 25.0 25.9 
1913 26.3 27.0 25.0 29.7 25.0 25.0 26.1 
1929 28.1 29.5 28.0 31.2 26.6 26.3 27.7 
1938 31.5 31.4 32.7 33.2 31.1 30.2 31.6 
1950 38.1 42.7 37.4 39.2 35.8 36.5 36.9 
1960 42.8 50.2 40.8 44.0 39.6 40.4 41.0 
1970 46.5 52.9 45.1 48.5 43.0 44.5 44.9 
1980 50.2 57.9 48.2 51.4 46.1 48.7 48.3 
1990 52.9 64.4 50.1 54.7 47.5 50.0 50.1 
2000 53.7 68.9 48.1 51.1 49.3 51.3 50.1 
2007 55.3 70.7 48.6 50.7 51.2 54.5 51.8 
Sources: See the text and Appendix A     
        
Table D-2 Adult Literacy Rates in Africa and its Main Regions   
(% Population 15 years and above)     
        
 Africa North Central Southern West East SSA 
1870 3.7 5.9 2.2 6.4 1.1 1.7 2.8 
1880 4.1 5.8 2.0 8.5 1.2 1.8 3.4 
1890 4.8 6.8 1.8 11.1 1.3 2.0 4.0 
1900 5.5 7.6 1.6 14.8 1.5 2.4 4.8 
1913 5.7 8.6 1.5 13.6 1.8 3.0 4.8 
1929 8.8 11.9 1.6 18.2 4.3 7.8 8.0 
1938 10.0 12.4 2.8 21.6 5.1 7.5 9.3 
1950 13.3 18.3 4.4 25.3 9.1 9.4 12.1 
1960 19.9 21.5 13.4 38.3 12.9 16.2 19.5 
1970 27.4 27.4 23.0 47.2 18.1 25.5 27.3 
1980 37.2 36.2 33.8 57.3 27.7 35.9 37.4 
1990 47.9 44.3 44.6 62.8 43.0 47.5 48.8 
2000 57.4 56.0 62.4 72.6 51.2 53.7 57.7 
2007 62.8 67.2 63.9 74.7 57.7 57.9 61.8 
Sources: See the text and Appendix A     
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Table D-3 Gross Enrolment Rates in Africa and its Main Regions (%)  
(primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment over population ages 5 to 24) 
        
 Africa North Central Southern West East SSA 
1870 2.0 3.0 1.0 2.8 1.0 1.2 1.6 
1880 2.3 3.5 1.0 3.6 1.0 1.4 1.8 
1890 2.8 4.4 1.3 4.7 1.1 1.5 2.1 
1900 2.8 4.5 1.0 5.4 1.1 1.7 2.2 
1913 3.7 5.2 1.1 8.8 1.3 2.0 3.2 
1929 7.5 11.3 4.1 14.8 3.4 5.1 6.5 
1938 10.1 15.7 11.1 17.6 4.3 5.2 8.6 
1950 12.8 15.6 17.7 22.8 7.8 6.8 12.1 
1960 20.3 29.3 24.4 31.4 13.7 10.8 18.0 
1970 27.9 38.5 36.3 39.5 19.2 17.3 25.2 
1980 42.2 49.0 45.7 49.1 41.0 31.8 40.5 
1990 43.9 59.5 40.7 54.8 38.8 31.6 40.1 
2000 48.1 71.5 32.5 57.5 42.6 37.7 42.7 
2007 56.4 72.9 47.8 65.5 48.7 51.9 52.8 
Sources: See the text and Appendix A     
        
Table D-4 GDP per Head in Africa and its Main Regions (1990 Geary-Khamis $) 
 Africa North Central Southern West East SSA 
        
1870 498 624 307 523 541 313 446 
1880 506 650 322 583 485 324 447 
1890 531 706 326 659 457 354 463 
1900 557 747 333 758 448 395 492 
1913 628 906 361 808 482 484 542 
1929 682 955 406 914 533 551 607 
1938 755 1023 462 1086 574 584 682 
1950 887 1118 657 1472 757 526 830 
1960 1054 1314 832 1794 872 609 988 
1970 1340 1783 897 2357 1096 714 1229 
1980 1524 2550 849 2353 1210 751 1270 
1990 1433 2673 775 2135 1037 706 1131 
2000 1460 2913 624 2137 1073 748 1123 
2007 1821 3673 728 2581 1501 924 1410 
Sources: See the text and Appendices A and B    
 
